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Workers will not pay for general on-the-job training if contracts are not enforceable. Firms
may if there are mobility frictions. Private information about worker productivities, however,
prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere. Their new employers
then receive external beneﬁts from their training. Training ﬁrms increase proﬁts by offering
apprenticeships committing them to high wages for trainees retained on completion. At those
wages, only good workers are retained, which signals their productivity and reduces the ex-
ternal beneﬁts if they subsequently quit. Regulation of apprenticeship length (a historically
important feature) can enhance efﬁciency, as can appropriate subsidies.
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Certain transferable skills are most efﬁciently acquired in the workplace and many policy mak-
ers view this general training as potentially crucial for enhancing labour productivity. However,
there is little consensus about whether market provision of such general training is efﬁcient.1
Becker (1964) showed how, in a competitive economy without distortions, workers invest in,
and ﬁrms supply, efﬁcient levels of general training. His analysis provides an intellectual un-
derpinning for the absence in the US of a national system of accreditation for post-high school
training and was used to justify dismantling the UK system of trade apprenticeships.2 Sub-
sequent analysis of policy intervention has focused on the consequences of imperfect capital
markets in which workers do not have access to funds to pay for general training. If, in a fric-
tionless market, workers do not purchase transferable skills, ﬁrms will not supply them because
trained workers can earn a wage equal to their trained marginal product at other ﬁrms and will
quit unless this wage is matched by the training ﬁrm. The training ﬁrm will, as a result, be
unable to recoup any return on the training provided. Consistent with this, Lynch (1992) ﬁnds
that most on-the-job training in the US outside formal apprenticeships is ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Argu-
ments of this type have prompted calls to facilitate workers’ access to funds to pay for general
training.
There are, however, reasons to think that workers’ lack of access to capital to buy training
is not the only reason for inefﬁcient general training. The present paper explores other reasons,
reasons that arise because training is a complex commodity provided by heterogeneous ﬁrms
for heterogeneous trainees, and argues that these reasons are more consistent with the long his-
tory over several centuries of regulation of labour training provisions and the entitlements of
employer and employee—see Earle (1989, ch.3). The complexity of training means that spec-
ifying the training to be provided in a way that is enforceable using a contract is problematic.
We show that, as a result, trainees may not pay directly for general training even if they have the
funds (or loans) to do so. Firms may pay for some general training if there are mobility frictions
in skilled labour markets, as an extensive recent literature (discussed below) has shown. How-
ever, this leaves two crucial questions: what is the appropriate economic relationship between
the training ﬁrm and its’ trainees? What is the role of policy given that there is a potential for
market failure in the provision of both training levels and the number of workers trained that a
policy of providing loans will not overcome.
We analyse two forms of economic relationship between a general training ﬁrm and its
trainees. In the ﬁrst, a ﬁrm trains a worker and then set a wage schedule that just persuades that
worker not to quit given other ﬁrms’ imperfect information about the worker’s productivity.
1See, for example, U.S. Department of Labor (1989) and Finegold and Soskice (1988).
2Thus, for example, Lees and Chiplin (1970) base their criticism of the UK grant-levy system to support
training in the Industrial Training Act (1964) on the Becker human capital model. The system was subsequently
abolished.
1In the second, the ﬁrm again provides general training but offers a contract in which a worker
accepts a low “apprentice” wage for a speciﬁed duration in return for a guaranteed high wage
if retained after the end of the apprenticeship that ensures that the worker’s productivity is
revealed to the market. The apprentice contract delivers higher proﬁts to training ﬁrms and
more trained workers.
Apprenticeship is a contractual arrangement for general training that has been common in
many countries sinceat leastmedievaltimes, seePirenne (1936), and isstill widely used in Ger-
many. Common features of many apprenticeships are that they last for a duration speciﬁed at
the start, not just until the apprentice has demonstrated satisfactory acquisition of the appropri-
ate skills, and that the apprentice receives a substantial pay increase at the end. Apprenticeships
have, moreover, been subject to extensive regulation by guilds and by governments. Particu-
larly important historically has been regulation of their length. Regulation is regarded by some
as improving the provision of training compared to what an unregulated market would provide,
though policy differs considerably between countries—see, for example, Soskice (1994) and
other chapters in Lynch (1994). This paper not only shows how apprenticeship contracts of this
type can help resolve the incentive problems that non-contractibility of training introduces. It
also shows that regulation to increasethe apprenticeship length, coupled with asubsidy foreach
completed apprenticeship if the deadweight loss from raising taxes is not too high, can reduce
the inefﬁciency of training provision. Importantly, these conclusions about apprenticeships ap-
ply even if training under an apprenticeship is no more effective at preventing trainees quitting
than training without one. Thus, the difﬁculty of preventing premature quits by apprentices
that historians such as Elbaum (1989) discuss in the context of the decline of apprenticeships
in the US from the end of the 18th century is not sufﬁcient reason to abandon their use even
though, in our model, premature quitting will reduce both training levels and the numbers of
apprentices trained.
The essential reasons for these conclusions are as follows. Because of the problems of
specifying the training to be provided in a contract, workers will pay upfront only the expected
value to them of the training that it is in ﬁrms’ own interests to provide. As long as there are
ﬁrms for which the cost of providing training is too high to be worthwhile, workers will not
pay upfront for the full beneﬁt they receive from the training by ﬁrms that actually train. With
a large enough number of high cost training ﬁrms, they will not pay anything upfront.
While labour market frictions may result in ﬁrms providing some general training even
if workers do not pay directly for it, there are two reasons recognised in the literature why
the amount of such training may be inefﬁcient. The ﬁrst is that, when workers are free to quit
without penalty, market frictions typically cannot prevent trainees using that freedom to capture
some of the returns to training in the form of a higher wage even if they do not actually quit.
Those returns are social returns to training that do not accrue to the training ﬁrm and so, as
in the analysis of hold-up discussed extensively by Williamson (1985), ﬁrms invest too little
2in training. To the extent that use of formal apprenticeship contracts reduces the ability of
trainees to capture returns from training, it reduces the extent of hold-up. However, this role
for apprenticeship contracts disappears if, as discussed by Elbaum (1989) for the US from the
late 18th century on, apprenticeships cease to be effective in imposing additional penalties for
premature quits.
The second reason why ﬁrm-supplied general training may be inefﬁcient, recognised in the
literature by Chang and Wang (1996), arises from asymmetric information about workers’ pro-
ductivities. When workers quit for jobs at other ﬁrms, that asymmetric information results in
their wages being, on average, less than their marginal products. Thus part of the return to their
general training goes to the new employers, an external beneﬁt of training that is captured by
neither trained workers nor training ﬁrms. Apprenticeship contracts have a role in mitigating
this external effect. A contract commits at least one party to do something at some time in the
future that it might not otherwise do when that time arrives. A practice well-documented for
Germany, see Soskice (1994) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), is that training ﬁrms retain
some trainees as skilled workers at the end of their apprenticeships. By committing in advance
to a high wage for these retained trainees, a training ﬁrm ensures that it retains only the better
workers with marginal product at least as great as that wage. Retention at the end of the appren-
ticeship then reveals information about the productivity of those retained and thus increases the
wage of those who subsequently quit. That both reduces the externality to the workers’ new
employers and makes trainees willing to work for a lower wage during the training period.
As a result, training ﬁrms make higher proﬁts from training than they would if they made no
commitment to future wages but merely determined them on a period by period basis. The
shorter the contract length, the sooner a training ﬁrm reveals its information about a trainee’s
productivity and thus the sooner quitting workers capture the returns to their training that ac-
crue after they quit, rather than those returns being an external beneﬁt to their new employers.
However, the shorter the contract length, the sooner retained workers receive a wage equal to
their full trained marginal product and thus the less time the training ﬁrm has in which to re-
coup the costs of training. The proﬁt maximizing contract length trades off these two effects.
Although modelled here in the context of asymmetric information about workers’ types, a sim-
ilar phenomenon may arise with other market frictions that result in workers’ current wages
inﬂuencing (through, for example, bargaining as in Acemoglu (1997)) the wages they obtain
when quitting. This role for apprenticeship contracts, unlike that of reducing hold-up, exists
even when apprenticeships do not reduce the ability of trainees to capture returns from training.
Apprenticeship contracts cannot, however, in general prevent some of the return to general
training being captured by trainees and, if they quit, by their new employers. As a result, even
with apprenticeship contracts, trainees receive less training than is efﬁcient. Moreover, when
ﬁrms vary in the cost of providing training places, too few workers are trained. These two
inefﬁciencies provide a natural role for regulation. We show that, by increasing the length of
3the training contract, regulation can increase the amount of training towards the efﬁcient level.
That is consistent with the historical tradition of regulation of the length of apprenticeships.
Of course, regulating the length of a contract reduces the proﬁts from training and thus the
number of ﬁrms that train. Even so, it is socially worthwhile. The essential reason is that, at
the proﬁt maximizing level of training, a small change in that level has only a second order
effect on proﬁt and, hence, only a second order effect on the number of workers trained. But,
it has a ﬁrst order effect on the amount of training received by each trainee and, because of the
externalities, this has a ﬁrst order effect on social welfare.
The adverse effect of regulation on the number of workers trained can be mitigated by a
subsidy to ﬁrms for each completed apprenticeship. We show that, while it is worth providing
some subsidy to increase the number of trainees if the deadweight loss of raising tax revenue
is not too high, there are limits to what such subsidies can achieve. The difﬁculty of enforc-
ing training by contract may, if the subsidy is large enough, result in ﬁrms using subsidized
“trainees” simply as cheap labour without in fact providing training, an issue of serious con-
cern with UK training policy, see Lee et al. (1990). That constrains the use of subsidies to
enhance training, a constraint that can be important for policy.
A number of recent papers have studied mobility frictions that result in ﬁrms investing in
some general training for their employees when workers do not pay for it. These papers fall
into four broad categories. Katz and Ziderman (1990), Chang and Wang (1996), and Acemoglu
and Pischke (1998) analyse asymmetric information between training ﬁrms and other potential
employers. Stevens (1994a, 1996), Acemoglu (1996), Acemoglu (1997), and Booth and Chat-
terji (1997) considerimperfect competition in skilled labour markets. Burdett and Smith (1996)
and Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) study matching frictions. Booth and Chatterji (1995) and
Acemoglu and Pischke (1997) discuss general training that is a joint product with speciﬁct r a i n -
ing. Consistent with such frictions, Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) conclude that ﬁrms in the
US do indeed extract some of the returns to general training. The present paper differs from
this literature in a number of important respects. First, it does not start from an assumption
that workers do not pay directly for general training but derives that as a conclusion. Second, it
shows how contracts, and in particular traditional apprenticeship contracts, are more proﬁtable
for training ﬁrms than simply determining wages optimally at each date in response to the quit
behaviour of trainees. And third, it shows the role for regulation, and in particular the histor-
ically important regulation of apprenticeship length, in improving on the market provision of
general training.
Of recent papers on training, only Cantor (1990) and Hermalin (1990) share our focus on
contract length. Contract length in Cantor reﬂects a trade-off between the ﬁrm’s preference for
a long pay-back period and the mitigation of a moral hazard problem—workers’ unobserved
effort inﬂuences the effectiveness of training but has a value to the worker that diminishes
with training contract length. Cantor’sa n a l y s i si sd i r e c t e da tﬁrm-speciﬁc training, not general
4training as here. Hermalin’s concern with contract length is as a selection device in the face of
worker adverse selection and the possible non-existence of equilibrium, again a very different
issue from any discussed here. Neither paper analyses the role for policy.
The next section of the paper sets out the model of general training. Section 3 analyses
the training provided in an unregulated market when contracts are not used. Section 4 shows
that ﬁrms make greater proﬁts by using an apprenticeship type arrangement. Regulation is
discussed in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss historical evidence for the approach adopted
here.
2 The model
Firms can each employ one worker. All untrained workers have productivity w0 per period of
time. A worker can be trained on the job if the ﬁrm sets up a training programme at a ﬁxed cost
k ∈
!
0, ¯ k
"
. With training, productivity increases to w0+ˆ γg(c),w h e r ec ≥ 0 is thevariablecost
incurred in training, g(c) is strictly concave with g(0) = 0a n dg  (0) =∞ ,a n dˆ γ ∈ {γ,¯ γ}
with 0 <γ<1 < ¯ γ is the realisation of a random variable determining worker type that is
independently distributed across workers with mean 1. This realisation is unknown to ﬁrms and
workers at the time of initial hiring and observed by only the training ﬁrm during training. The
amount of training c is observed by trainees and by other ﬁrms once it has been provided but
training is assumed to be too complex to specify its level in advance in an enforceable contract.
Firms differ only in the ﬁxed cost k. Each knows its own ﬁxed cost but this is unknown
to anybody else and we assume that it is not possible for ﬁr m st oe s t a b l i s har e p u t a t i o nf o rt h e
value of k. The conditions on g(c) ensure that some training is always worthwhile conditional
on the ﬁxed cost being incurred and so allow us to ignore the non-negativity constraint on c.
There are F (k) ﬁrms with ﬁxed cost less than or equal to k, so the total number of potential
jobs (and training places) is F(¯ k). We normalize the number of workers to 1 and assume both
that F (k) is twice continuously differentiable and that F(¯ k) is large (formally, F (k) →∞as
k → ¯ k). Thus workers can always get a job involving no training at wage w0.
For simplicity, we assume ﬁrms and workers are risk neutral and discount the future at the
same rate r. Workers enter the labour force at age 0 and have working lifetime T. Since job
turnover is important in practice, we generate that in a relatively simple way by workers of
both types deciding at the rate ρ that they wish to leave their current employer for a new one
for exogenous reasons independent of pay. This can be viewed as a simple way of capturing
that someturnoverisefﬁcient. Theeffectivediscount rate that aﬁrm applies to the future proﬁts
from a particular worker is thus r + ρ. Firms are inﬁnitely lived. Since we are interested in
training contracts that last longer than required for the training itself, we lose little by assuming
that training takes place instantaneously at the start of employment.
5For what follows, it is convenient to treat time as continuous and to deﬁne
β( t) ≡
1 − e−rt
r
(1)
δ( t) ≡
1 − e−(r+ρ)t
r + ρ
. (2)
Thefunctionβ( t)isthecapitalisation factorforturningaconstantﬂowover aperiodof length t
into a present discounted value, δ(t) the effective capitalisation factor for ﬁrms whose workers
quit at the rate ρ. For notational simplicity, let β ≡ β( T) and δ ≡ δ(T), the capitalisation
factors for the whole working lifetime T.
Training is general and thus valuable even if a worker quits, so the expected lifetime value
of the output of a workertrained to the level c isβ[w0+g(c)], that of an untrained worker βw0.
Conditional on a worker being trained, the efﬁcient level of training maximizes the difference
between the expected lifetime gain in output, βg(c), and the cost. It is the solution to
max
c≥0
βg(c) − c, (3)
that is, c∗ uniquely deﬁn e db yt h eﬁrst order condition
βg  #
c∗$
= 1. (4)
I ti s ,h o w e v e r ,e f ﬁcient to train only sufﬁcient workers for the gains from training βg (c∗) −c∗
to exceed the ﬁxed cost k.D e ﬁne k∗
1 by
k∗
1 = βg
#
c∗$
− c∗. (5)
It is never efﬁcient to train more than F(k∗
1) workers. That may, however, be more workers
than there are to train. Deﬁne k∗
2 by F(k∗
2) = 1, the highest k required to train all workers.
Then the efﬁcient number of workers to train is such that the ﬁxed cost of the highest cost ﬁrms
that train is k∗ deﬁned by
k∗ = min
%
k∗
1,k∗
2
&
. (6)
There are, however, three reasons in the model why achieving efﬁcient training may be
problematic. One is that a contract to provide a speciﬁed level of training is unenforceable.
The second is that, if low wages during training or upfront payments (bonds) are used to get
workers to pay for training, ﬁr m sw i t hh i g hv a l u e so fk may take on workers in order to get
cheap labour or the upfront payment without having any intention of actually providing the
training. Indeed, since such ﬁrms make zero proﬁts from employing an untrained worker, they
would always do better by agreeing to train a worker, taking the upfront payment, and then
going out of business. With a large number of high training cost ﬁrms that would cheat on
6any upfront payment by workers, workers are never prepared to offer such payments. While
this conclusion follows straightforwardly from the assumptions about non-contractibility and
heterogeneity of ﬁrms, we emphasise it here because of its important implications for general
training.3
The third reason why achieving efﬁcient training may be problematic is that workers, even
when apprenticed, can quit at any time without having to compensate the training ﬁrm for
doing so.4 That limits the extent to which a ﬁrm can recoup costs of training by employing
trained workers at a wage below their marginal product once training has been completed. To
see the implications of this, consider the payoff to a trainee who contemplates quitting for an
alternative ﬁrm. The alternative ﬁrm can observe how much training c a worker has actually
received once it has taken place—the lack of enforceability arises because of the problem of
describing the appropriate training in a contract beforehand. It does not, however, know the
trainee’s type. By the usual adverse selection argument (see, for example, Greenwald (1986)),
the training ﬁrm, which knows the trainee’s type, matches any outside offer no greater than
the trainee’s productivity. Thus the expected proﬁt to an alternative ﬁrm from any offer above
the productivity of a less productive worker (with ˆ γ = γ) is negative unless that worker is
quitting for exogenous reasons—the winner’sc u r s e . With continuous hiring, however, the ﬂow
of workers quitting for exogenous reasons is negligible relative to the stock of less productive
trainees. (Formally, the ﬂow is of order dt relative to the stock.) Thus, if there is even a small
cost (in addition to the wage cost) of hiring a new worker, it is never proﬁtable for an alternative
ﬁrmto offera wage higherthanthe trainingﬁrm would pay to retain a less productive trainee. It
is, however, worth offering a wage equal to the productivity of a less good trainee, less the ﬂow
value of the hiring cost, because that may attract workers quitting for exogenous reasons, some
of whom are the more productive type. Competition between alternative employers ensures
that they offer exactly that wage. The formal result is in Proposition 6 in Appendix A. Given
the practical importance of hiring costs, we treat the model without hiring costs studied here
as the limiting case in which the hiring cost goes to zero. Then the wage available to a trainee
who quits approaches the productivity of a less productive type w0 + γg(c) and the present
3If workers know each ﬁrm’s ﬁxed costs of training (for example, when ﬁxed costs are the same for all ﬁrms
as in Acemoglu and Pischke (1998)), they know which ﬁrms will actually train and so, even with the amount
of training non-contractible, are prepared to pay upfront for the full beneﬁt they receive from training by those
ﬁrms. In that case, an appropriately chosen contract can overcome the hold-up problem. If ﬁxed costs of training
are unknown to workers but there are only a ﬁnite number of high training cost ﬁrms, workers are prepared to
pay upfront an amount that depends inversely on the probability that a randomly selected ﬁrm will fail to train.
Thus this variation of the model is consistent with payment of initial fees for apprenticeships that were historically
commoninEngland, see Hamilton(1996). Incorporatingthisvariationintothe analysiscomplicatestheexposition
because the maximum upfront fee is endogenous but does not alter the result below that an unregulated market
provides less than the efﬁcient amount of training, see footnote 6 below. Thus, the basic conclusions of the paper
apply even where limited upfront fees are paid.
4Hamilton (1995) argues that relatively few apprentices in her sample from Montreal actually deserted. That
is, of course, entirely consistent with training ﬁrms designing contracts to induce them not to do so. Her sample
provides substantial evidence of contracts being drawn up with precisely this purpose in mind.
7discounted value of the remaining lifetime earnings of a trainee who quits at t ≤ T becomes
β( T − t)
’
w0 + γg(c)
(
, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (7)
(It applies from t = 0 because we have assumed training is instantaneous.) A training ﬁrm
must thus ensure that trainees have expected future utility at least as great as that in (7) if they
are not to quit.
3 Training without contracts
Suppose training ﬁrms do not offer training contracts but merely hire trainees, train them, and
pay them a wage high enough to induce them not to quit. Let w(t) denote the wage paid by the
ﬁrm at t. Then the present discounted value of expected future wages received from the ﬁrm is
W (t,T) given by
W (t,T) =
) T
t
w(θ)e−(r+ρ)(θ−t)dθ. (8)
In addition to this, the worker receives the wage w0 +γg(c) at any date subsequent to quitting
for exogenous reasons. By the standard calculation, the probability a worker employed at t has
quit for exogenous reasons by θ is 1 − e−ρ(θ−t). Thus the expected future utility of a worker
who does not quit at t is
W (t,T)+
’
w0 + γg(c)
() T
t
e−r(θ−t)
’
1 − e−ρ(θ−t)
(
dθ
= W (t,T) +
’
w0 + γg(c)
(!
β (T − t) − δ(T − t)
"
. (9)
For the worker not to quit for other than exogenous reasons, this expected future utility must
be at least as great as that in (7) for all t, which implies
W (t,T) ≥ δ (T − t)
’
w0 + γg (c)
(
, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (10)
The expected proﬁt  (k,c,W,T, S) of a ﬁrm with ﬁxed training cost k from training a
worker to the level c when the worker quits only for exogenous reasons is its expected revenue
δ
!
w0 + g(c)
"
, less its training costs k +c and its expected wage costs denoted by W,p l u st h e
expected present value S of any subsidy received for training paid at date T. Such subsidies
play a role in our discussion of regulation in Section 5.5 That is,
 (k,c,W,T, S) = δ
’
w0 + g(c)
(
− (k + c) − W + S. (11)
5The government could offer a subsidy to take on a trainee that is paid at the start of training but such a subsidy
provides no advantage and exacerbates the gains to ﬁrms from promising to train and taking the subsidy but not
actually training.
8We consider here the case in which it is not efﬁcient to train all employees entering the market,
that is k∗
1 < k∗
2. Stevens (1994b, pp. 561-2) discusses the evidence for this being the relevant
case for UK engineering during 1966-88. Other cases are discussed in Appendix C. When
k∗
1 < k∗
2, an unregulated market will never train all workers entering the workforce. Thus, there
will always be more employees entering the market than will be trained. Moreover, because
of the ﬁnite lifetimes of workers, it is never efﬁcient to start training workers who are not
new entrants to the market because they have a shorter remaining working lifetime to generate
returns on that training. New entrants not starting training straightaway, therefore, remain
untrained for ever and earn market wage w0 for their remaining working lifetime. Untrained
workers who quit for exogenous reasons can always get another job at the wage w0. Thus the
present discounted utility of a worker not successful in obtaining a training place on entering
the market is βw0 and the lifetime value of wages that equates the demand for workers with the
supply of workers, denoted ¯ W,i sa l s oβw0. Thus to hire a trainee, a training ﬁrm must ensure
that the utility from taking a training place, given by (9) for t = 0, is no less than βw0,w h i c h
implies
W (0,T) ≥ δ
’
w0 + γg (c)
(
− βγg(c). (12)
But to prevent a trainee quitting immediately after being trained, the present discounted value
of wages offered by the ﬁrm must satisfy the higher value given by (10) for t = 0. Thus (10)
for t = 0 is a binding constraint on the lifetime wages that ﬁrms must pay to retain trainees.
Aw a g eo fw0 + γg(c) at each t satisﬁes this constraint with equality both for t = 0 and for
all subsequent t so, with this wage, trained employees quit for an alternative employer only
for exogenous reasons. Substitution of this wage into (11) gives expected proﬁt from training
without a contract when there is no subsidy
 0 (k,c) = δ
’
w0 + g(c)
(
− (k + c) − δ
’
w0 + γg(c)
(
(13)
= (1 − γ)δg (c) − (k + c). (14)
Proposition 1 (i) The level of training c0 that maximises the expected proﬁt of a training ﬁrm
in the absence of a contract is given by
δg (c0) =
1
1 − γ
. (15)
Moreover, c0 < c∗,t h ee f ﬁcient level of training, and decreases with ρ, the exogenous quit rate,
and with γ. (ii) Training is carried out by only those ﬁrms with k ≤ k0 deﬁned by
k0 = (1 − γ)δg
*
c0
+
− c0. (16)
Moreover, k0 < k∗
1 deﬁned in (5), so fewer workers are trained than is efﬁcient.
9Proof. (i) It follows from (14) that, because g(c) is differentiable and strictly concave,
 0 (k,c) is a differentiable and strictly concave function of c. Thus the level of training that
maximises expected proﬁt is given uniquely by the ﬁrst-order condition that corresponds to
(15). Given g (c) strictly concave, that c0 < c∗ follows directly from comparison of (15) with
(4) and 0 <γ<1, that c0 is decreasing in ρ follows from (15) and the deﬁnition of δ in (2),
and that c0 is decreasing in γ follows from (15). (ii) It follows from (14) that, k0 deﬁned in
(16) is the highest ﬁx e dc o s to ft r a i n i n gf o rw h i c h 0 #
k,c0$
≥ 0, so only ﬁrms with k ≤ k0
train. Note that c∗ maximises βg(c) − c,w h e r e a sc0 maximises (1 − γ)δg(c) − c,a n dt h a t
β>(1 − γ)δ. It thus follows directly from comparison of (16) with (5) that k0 < k∗
1.
The intuition for these results is as follows. The level of training c0 is less than c∗, the
efﬁcient level of training deﬁned in (4) both because γ>0 and because δ<β . As long
as γ>0, the wage the worker can get by quitting increases with the amount of training the
ﬁrm provides. Thus, the worker captures part of the return on the ﬁrm’s investment, a form
of Williamson’s hold-up, and the ﬁrm under invests in training. In the extreme case as γ
approaches 1, the ﬁrm is unable to earn any return on its investment in training and thus the
amount of training approaches zero. At the other extreme, as γ approaches 0, the amount of
training does not, however, approach theefﬁcient level c∗ becauseδ<β . The reason for δ<β ,
as is clear from (1) and (2), is that ρ>0, that is, some employees quit for exogenous reasons.
Because the training is general, it is valuable even when workers quit and so still generates
a social return. However, the training ﬁrm does not capture any of the return arising after a
worker quits for exogenous reasons. That return is received by the worker’s new employer,
w h oa c q u i r e sa ne m p l o y e ew i t he x p e c t e dp r o d u c t i v i t yw0 + g(c) at a wage w0 +γg(c). Only
if both γ and ρ are zero do training ﬁrms invest efﬁciently. Moreover, the number of workers
t r a i n e di st h e na l s oe f ﬁcient because the highest ﬁxed cost that ﬁrms will incur in order to train
is k∗ deﬁned in (6).6
6In the text, we have treated the case in which no worker makes an upfront payment because of the high prob-
ability that a randomly chosen ﬁrm will default on training by going out of business. (Formally, that probability
approaches 1 because we have assumed F (k) →∞as k → ¯ k.) If, however, F
#¯ k
$
is ﬁnite, the probability that a
randomly chosen ﬁrm trains is F (k)/F
#¯ k
$
when k is the highest ﬁxed cost at which it is proﬁtable to train. In the
absence of upfront payments, a worker receives a gain from joining a ﬁrm that trains of βγg (c), the difference
between the expression in (7) at t = 0a n dβw0. The maximum upfront payment that would be made by a worker
not knowing a ﬁrm’s type, and so whether it will actually train, is thus B = βγg(c) F (k)/F
#¯ k
$
.T oat r a i n i n g
ﬁrm, this payment is a lump sum independent of the training it actually chooses. (This is where the analysis differs
crucially from the case where the level of training is contractible.) Thus training ﬁrms choose the same amount of
training c0 as without an upfront payment, which we already know to be below the efﬁcient level c∗. The upfront
payment, however, increases the highest ﬁxed cost for which it is worth training to kB given by
kB = (1 − γ)δg
*
c0
+
− c0 +
F
#
kB$
F
#¯ k
$ βγg
*
c0
+
,
which is greater than k0.H o w e v e r ,kB < k∗
1 ≡ βg (c∗) − c∗ b e c a u s e ,b yd e ﬁnition, c∗ maximizes βg (c) − c,s o
βg (c∗)−c∗ >βg
#
c0$
−c0, and β>(1 − γ)δ +γβF
#
kB$
/F
#¯ k
$
. Thus the number of workers trained is also
still below the efﬁcient level.
104 Training contracts
In the analysis of the preceding section, training ﬁrms do not offer training contracts. They
merely hire trainees, train them, and pay them a wage high enough to induce them not to quit.
Alternatively, training ﬁrms may offer an apprenticeship contract with the following character-
istics even if (by, for example, reducing the payoff to quitting below that in (7)) the contract
does not itself reduce the ability of trainees to capture returns from training. Trainees undertake
to work for a wage lower than if they were hired without a contract for a speciﬁed period in
return for an assurance of a higher (skilled) wage if the ﬁrm continues to employ them after
that period. The higher wage is set so that the training ﬁrm offers to continue the employment
of more able trainees but not of less able ones. The information contained in that offer ensures
that more able trained workers can earn their marginal product with any other employer and
hence, by competition, with their training ﬁrm. A training ﬁrm’s incentives to train are then
unaffected if a trained worker quits after this stage because that worker’sw a g ee q u a l st h em a r -
ginal product. We shall show that this contract is more proﬁtable, and that as a result more
workers are trained.
In analysing the implications of such a contract, we again consider the case in which it is
not efﬁcient to train all workers (k∗
1 < k∗
2). Formally, the training contract speciﬁes a period of
length τ (which we call contract length) after which the training ﬁrm is committed, if it subse-
quently employs the trained worker, to pay a speciﬁed wage w strictly between the productivity
of a worker of type γ trained to whatever level c the ﬁrm wishes to commit itself to provide,
namely w0 + γg(c), and the productivity of a worker of type ¯ γ t r a i n e dt ot h a tl e v e l ,n a m e l y
w0 +¯ γg(c).T h eﬁrm is not required to employ the worker after τ—it merely commits itself
to the wage w if it does so. The contract also speciﬁes w(t),f o r0≤ t ≤ τ, the wage paid at
time t ≤ τ after its start.7
The effect of this contract on the wage of workers trained to a given level c is illustrated in
Figure 1. With no contract as in the previous section, the winner’s curse ensures all workers
earn wage w0 + γg(c) throughout their lifetime T, just enough to induce them not to quit.
With a contract of length τ, more able workers are retained at the end of the contract and earn
their marginal product w0 +¯ γg (c) from τ on. Less able workers are not retained and obtain
another job with wage equal to their marginal product w0+γg(c) from τ on. Because workers
do not know their own type until it is revealed by the ﬁrm, their expected wage from τ on if
they stay until the end of their contract is greater than w0 + γg(c), so the wage w(t) during
the period up to τ can be reduced below w0 + γg (c) without inducing them to quit. Thus, by
using a contract that makes it credible to reveal workers’ types at the end of the contract period,
7This contract is similar to the “up-or-out” contracts analysed in Kahn and Huberman (1988), Waldman (1990)
and Prendergast (1993) for speciﬁc investments. Other important differences are that here the contract induces
ﬁrms, rather than employees, to invest in training and the date at which the “up or out” decision is made (τ)i s
agreed as part of the contract, not given exogenously, which enables us to study the role of contract length.
11τ T t
wage
g(c) γ w
0 +
γg(c) w
0 +
w(t)
0
Figure 1: Effect of training contract on wages
at r a i n i n gﬁrm induces trainees to accept lower wages during the contract period.
4.1 Incentive compatibility for training ﬁrms
Revelation will, of course, occur only if the amount of training actually provided by the ﬁrm
makes it proﬁtable to retain more able trained workers and unproﬁtable to retain less able ones.
There are three possibilities to consider. The ﬁrst is that the training c actually provided is such
that w0 + γg (c) ≥ w. In this case, the wage w is no higher than the wage w0 + γg(c) a
trained worker can obtain elsewhere, so the ﬁrm has to pay w0 + γg (c) to retain the worker.
This reduces to the case of the previous section for which we already know it is optimal for the
ﬁrm to set c = c0 and receive proﬁt  0 #
k,c0$
. As long as the ﬁrm can make greater proﬁts by
setting w at some level such that it actually trains to c  = c0, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to offer a
training contract.
The second possibility is that the training c actually provided by the ﬁrm is such that w0 +
γg(c) <w<w 0 +¯ γg(c). We show in Appendix B that the training wage can be selected so
that the ﬁrm wishes to retain even a less good trainee (of type γ) during the period up to date
τ. Thus, during that period the training ﬁrm receives the expected output of the trained worker,
δ(τ)
!
w0 + g(c)
"
. On completion of the contract, a trained worker is either retained by the
training ﬁrm at wage w o rs e e k saj o bi naﬁrm with a vacancy. It is never in the ﬁrm’s interest
to retain a less good worker (type γ) since such a worker has productivity less than w.I t i s
always in the training ﬁrm’s interest to retain a better worker (type ¯ γ)s i n c es u c haw o r k e rh a s
12productivity greater than w.8 By retaining a worker, therefore, the ﬁrm signals that the worker
is a good type. Outside ﬁrms will then be prepared to offer such a worker a wage of w0+¯ γg(c)
and the ﬁrm will have to match that offer to retain the worker. The ﬁrm’sp r o ﬁts from training
are zero from τ on and are given by (11) with δ replaced by δ(τ)9
 (k,c,W,τ,S) ≡ δ (τ)
’
w0 + g (c)
(
− (k + c) − W + S, (17)
where W is the total expected wage payment up to τ and S is the present value of any subsidy
to training, now assumed to be paid at the end of the contract period.
The third possibility is that the training c actually provided by the ﬁrm is such that w0 +
¯ γg(c) ≤ w. In this case it is not proﬁtable to retain a less productive trainee (type γ) and, even
if the ﬁrm retains a more productive trainee (type ¯ γ), it cannot make positive proﬁts from doing
t h i s ,s oi t sp r o ﬁts from training are the same as in (17). Thus the analysis for the previous case
applies to this case too.10
Lemma 1 With an apprentice contract that speciﬁes τ,wand W, the optimal training level c
for a ﬁrm that trains is given by
δ(τ)g  (c) = 1. (18)
The optimal apprentice training level is increasing in τ.
Proof. Given a training contract that speciﬁes τ,w and W,t h eﬁrm chooses the amount
of training c to maximize  (k,c,W,τ,S) given by (17).11 It follows from (17) that, because
g(c) is differentiable and strictly concave,  (k,c,W,τ,S) is a differentiable and strictly con-
cave function of c. Thus the level of training that maximises expected proﬁt is given uniquely
by the ﬁrst-order condition that corresponds to (18). Moreover, from (2), δ( τ)is increasing
in τ. Thus, given g (c) strictly concave, it follows from (18) that training c is an increasing
function of contract length τ.
8Many traineesare in fact retained. For Germany, AcemogluandPischke (1998) report that 84%of apprentices
stay on, at least initially, with their training ﬁrm. Soskice (1994, p. 56) argues that “the postapprentices which a
nontraining company will be likely to hire are those whom their training companies have chosen not to keep.”
9A training ﬁrm receives proﬁts from retaining a good worker for the period until outside ﬁrms make that
worker an offer of w0 +¯ γg(˜ c). Formally, we consider the limit as this period goes to zero. If the period is longer,
the optimal contract length is reduced and the training ﬁrm will, as Soskice (1994) argues for Germany, continue
to make proﬁts from retaining the better trained workers after the end of their training contract. Competition
between ﬁrms in initial hiring will then ensure that ﬁrms do not recoup all the training costs during the training
period, again as Soskice (1994) argues for Germany. We do not pursue this issue here.
10Because the wage available from other ﬁrms is w0 + γg(c), there is potential for a proﬁtable renegotiation
between the training ﬁrm and a more productive trainee to reduce the wage to a level at which both gain by
having the ﬁrm retain the employee. The trainee can, however, ensure that the renegotiated wage is strictly above
w0+γg(c) because, for w0+γg (c), a threat to quit is credible. Moreover, once the ﬁrm agrees to a wage strictly
above w0+γg (c), it reveals the worker to be of the more productive type so that, by the argument for the previous
case, outside ﬁrms bid the wage up to w0 +¯ γg(c). Thus the ﬁrm still makes no proﬁts from retaining the trainee.
11Strictly, this maximisation is subject to the inequality constraint that c is not so large that, given W, the trainee
quits. The choice of optimal contract, however, ensures that W is always such that this constraint does not bind.
13The intuition for this result is simply that the longer τ, the longer is the period for which
the ﬁrm receives returns to training and thus the more training it provides. The contract cannot,
however, be longer than τ = T, so the highest level of training that can be induced in this way
is ¯ c deﬁned by
δg  (¯ c) = 1. (19)
The ﬁrm can therefore be induced to provide any amount of training c ∈ [0, ¯ c] by a contract of
length τ (c) that satisﬁes (18) for that c. The deﬁnition of δ(τ) in (2) can be used to write
τ (c) ≡−
1
r + ρ
ln
,
1 −
r + ρ
g (c)
-
, for c ∈ [0, ¯ c]. (20)
4.2 Incentive compatibility for trainees
We next determine the constraints imposed by workers’ incentives to join, and remain in, an
apprenticeship. For this, we derive the implied relationship between the amount of training, c,
and the total wages paid during the contract period, W. The expected remaining lifetime utility
at t <τfrom a trainee staying with the training ﬁrm can be derived as follows. Let W (t,τ)
denote the expected present discounted value of wages over the remainder of the contract.
G i v e nt r a i n i n gt ol e v e lc, a worker who quits for exogenous reasons before the end of the
contract receives wage w0 + γg (c) from the date of quitting. A worker who has not quit for
exogenous reasons before the end of the contract receives the wage w0 +¯ γg(c) from τ on
if of type ¯ γ and w0 + γg(c) if of type γ, with expected value w0 + g(c).A s i n t h e c a s e
without a contract, the probability a worker employed at t has quit for exogenous reasons by θ
is 1 − e−ρ(θ−t). The expected value of all these components for τ ≤ T is
W (t,τ)+
’
w0 + γg(c)
() τ
t
e−r(θ−t)
’
1 − e−ρ(θ−t)
(
dθ
+
.’
w0 + γg(c)
(’
1 − e−ρ(τ−t)
(
+
’
w0 + g(c)
(
e−ρ(τ−t)
/) T
τ
e−r(θ−t)dθ
= W (t,τ) +
’
w0 + γg(c)
(!
β (τ − t) − δ (τ − t)
"
+
.’
w0 + γg(c)
(
+ (1 − γ)g (c)e−ρ(τ−t)
/!
β( T − t) − β( τ− t)
"
(21)
= W (t,τ) +
’
w0 + γg(c)
(!
β (T − t) − δ(τ − t)
"
+ (1 − γ)g(c)e−ρ(τ−t) !
β (T − t) − β (τ − t)
"
. (22)
To induce a trainee to complete the contract, therefore, the expected value of wages paid during
the contract period must ensure that this expression is at least as great as that in (7) for all 0 ≤
t <τ , which gives the following incentive compatibility condition for a worker to complete
14the contract:
W (t,τ)≥ δ( τ− t)
’
w0 + γg(c)
(
−(1 − γ)g(c)e−ρ(τ−t) !
β(T − t) − β( τ− t)
"
, for all 0 ≤ t <τ. (23)
Fortunately (23) has an intuitive interpretation: the apprentice expects to be paid a sum
equal to the discounted value of potential outside earnings up to the end of the apprenticeship
less the present value of the increase in earnings from completing the apprenticeship. When it
is not efﬁcient to train all workers, (23) is a binding constraint at t = 0o nw a g e sd u r i n gt h e
contract because the expected utility from quitting immediately after being trained, given by
(7) for t = 0, is strictly greater than βw0. The lowest present discounted value of wages W for
which this constraint is satisﬁed at t = 0 for a contract of length τ (c) is
W = δ[τ(c)]
’
w0 + γg(c)
(
− (1 − γ)g(c)e−ρτ(c) {β − β [τ (c)]}. (24)
Ofcourse, becausepotentialtraineesdonotknowaﬁrm’sﬁxedcostoftraining, theycannotrule
out the possibility that a ﬁrm with a high ﬁxed cost of training will agree to a training contract
withoutintendingactuallytotrainiftraineewagesarelowenoughforittobeproﬁtabletodoso.
Because, however, workers can observe whether they have in fact been trained, such behaviour
can be prevented by an initial training wage greater than w0. The reason is as follows. An
untrained worker can always quit to earn w0 and will do so, thus ensuring the ﬁrm makes a loss
from offering the training contract, unless the remainder of the training contract provides utility
higher than provided by the wage w0. But if the remainder of the training contract provides
that higher utility, a ﬁrm that promises to train but does not do so will make a loss from a
training contract if the initial wage is greater than w0.12 We show in Appendix B that for any
W satisfying (24), there exists a wage path w(t) with w(0) >w 0 that ensures (23) is satisﬁed
for all 0 ≤ t <τ( c) without inducing the ﬁrm to dismiss a less good trainee before τ( c).
12If trainees do not observe whether they have actually been trained, they can be sure that a ﬁrm will not agree
to a training contract unless it intends to train only if expected wages over the whole training contract are no less
than the untrained wage, that is, W ≥ δ [τ (c)]w0. The reason is as follows. Untrained workers will not be kept
on at the end of the training contract and will be paid only w0 in the market thereafter. Because there are lots
of high cost training ﬁrms which will never train (formally, F(¯ k) →∞ ), the probability of being trained in a
randomly chosen ﬁrm is negligible unless there is self selection of ﬁrms. Thus, one of two conditions needs to be
satisﬁed for potential trainees to agree to a contract. One of these is that trainees receive higher utility even if the
ﬁrm does not train than they would by not taking on a training contract. The other is that a ﬁr mm a k e sl e s sp r o ﬁt
by signing a training contract if it does not in fact intend to train than if it simply paid the wage w0.B o t ho ft h e s e
are equivalent to the condition speciﬁed. Substitution for W from (24) allows that condition to be written as the
constraint γδ[τ(c)] − (1 − γ)e−ρτ(c) !
β − β (τ (c))
"
≥ 0. In this case, it turns out that the additional constraint
is always binding with the optimum contract, which implies an optimal contract length that is independent of the
function g(c). The length of the apprenticeship is then the same for different trades for which γ, ρ and r are the
same even if the function g(c) is different.
154.3 Optimal training contracts
We next determine the optimal training contract. Substitution from (24) into (17) gives the
expected proﬁt from choosing τ such that training is to level c
˜  (k,c, S) = (1 − γ)g(c)
.
δ[τ( c)] + e−ρτ(c) !
β − β( τ( c))
"/
− (k + c) + S. (25)
To compare the outcomes with and without training contracts, it is convenient to deﬁne
˜ δ( τ)≡ δ( τ)+ e−ρτ !
β − β( τ)
"
. (26)
This corresponds to an adjusted discount factor that can be interpreted in the following way.
Theactual discountrate of bothﬁrm and worker isr, corresponding to the discountfactor β (τ).
Trainees quit at the rate ρ. If a trainee quits during the contract period, the ﬁrm receives no
more return on its investment, so the effective discount rate during the contract period becomes
r +ρ, corresponding to the discount factor δ( τ) . Once the contract period has ended, however,
workers receive all the returns to training whether or not they quit, so the quit rate ρ no longer
inﬂuences the effective discount rate after the end of the contract. Moreover, these returns
are passed back to ﬁrms in the form of lower wages during the contract period. The present
discounted value of an increase in the post-contract wage that gets passed back to the ﬁrm is
β − β (τ), which increases with the length of the post-contract period. But this accrues only
if the trainee does not quit before the end of the contract period, so it is multiplied by the
probability e−ρτ. The discount factor ˜ δ(τ) adjusts δ(τ) for this. From the deﬁnitions of β (t)
and δ(t) in (1) and (2), note that ˜ δ (0) = β and ˜ δ(T) = δ. Thus, if the contract lasts the whole
lifetime T so there is no post contract period, the effective discount factor is δ whereas, if the
contract has zero length so the post contract period consistent of the whole working lifetime,
the effective discount rate becomes β. Moreover,
˜ δ
 
(τ) = δ  (τ) − ρe−ρτ !
β − β( τ)
"
− e−ρτβ  (τ)
=− ρe−ρτ !
β − β (τ)
"
(27)
< 0, for τ<T.
We thus have
˜ δ (0) = β
β>˜ δ(τ) > δ, for 0 <τ<T (28)
˜ δ (T) = δ.
16Proﬁt ˜  (k,c, S) deﬁned in (25) can then be written in terms of ˜ δ[τ( c)]a s
˜  (k,c, S) = (1 − γ)˜ δ[τ( c)]g(c) − (k + c) + S. (29)
Proposition 2 Use of an apprentice contract increases the proﬁtaﬁrm receives from train-
ing. It is proﬁtable for more ﬁrms to train, and more workers are trained, with an apprentice
contract than without.
Proof. Consider the optimal training c0 when no contract is used given by (15). It follows
from comparison of (15) with (18) in Lemma 1 that to induce training of c0 with an apprentice
contract would require a contract of length τ0 satisfying δ
#
τ0$
= (1 − γ)δ, which implies
τ0 < T since, by deﬁnition, δ(T) = δ. It follows from (28) that ˜ δ
#
τ0$
>δ . It then follows
from comparison of (14) with (29) that, when there is no subsidy, proﬁt is greater when c0
is achieved with an apprentice contract than with no contract. Since c0 maximizes expected
proﬁt when there is no contract, it follows that a training ﬁrm always makes greater expected
proﬁt with a contract than without. The highest ﬁx e dc o s to ft r a i n i n gf o rw h i c hp r o ﬁts are
non-negative is
k (c, S) ≡ (1 − γ)˜ δ[τ( c)]g(c) − c + S. (30)
Because proﬁts for any given k are higher with an apprentice contract than without, more ﬁrms
train and the number of workers trained is higher.
Proposition 3 The level of training and the number of trainees under apprentice contracts are
l o w e rt h a ni se f ﬁcient. The length of the apprentice contract is strictly less than the whole
working lifetime T.
Proof. Theoptimal training ˜ c withatraining contract ensuresthat thederivative ofexpected
proﬁt with respect to c, namely
∂ ˜  (k, ˜ c, S)
∂c
= (1 − γ)
.
˜ δ
!
τ(˜ c)
"
g  (˜ c) + ˜ δ
  !
τ(˜ c)
"
τ (˜ c)g(˜ c)
/
− 1, (31)
is either zero, or positive but with τ(˜ c) = T, the longest possible contract length. (Note that
τ  (c) > 0.) However, from (27) and (28), ˜ δ (T) = δ and ˜ δ
 
(T) = 0. It thus follows from (18)
i nL e m m a1t h a tt h ed e r i v a t i v ei n( 3 1 )i sn e g a t i v ef o rτ (c) = T, which implies that τ (˜ c) < T.
Thus the optimal training contract certainly lasts less than the trainee’s whole working lifetime
T. It also follows from (18) that ˜ c < ¯ c deﬁned in (19). Moreover, since ¯ c is less than the
efﬁcient level c∗ whenever ρ>0, training is below the efﬁcient level. It thus follows from (30)
that k (˜ c,0) < k∗
1 deﬁn e di n( 5 ) ,s ot h en u m b e ro fw o r k e r st r a i n e di sa l s ob e l o wt h ee f ﬁcient
level in the absence of a subsidy.
The intuition for these results is as follows. As explained in the previous section, one
reason for training being inefﬁciently low when there is no training contract is that the training
17ﬁrm does not capture any of the return to training arising after the trainee quits for exogenous
reasons. That return is received by the worker’s new employer, who acquires an employee
with expected productivity w0 + g (c) at a wage w0 + γg(c). A training contract provides
a mechanism for the training ﬁrm to commit to ensuring its trainee receives a wage equal to
marginal product after the end of the training contract, the period from τ to T in Figure 1.
Thus, when an exogenous quit occurs after the end of the training contract, the worker’sn e w
employer does not capture any of the return to training. That return goes to the worker who, in
turn, passes it to the training ﬁrm in the form of lower wages during the training contract. So
the training ﬁrm captures more of the return to training. To see this more formally, consider the
limiting case of no exogenous quits, ρ = 0. Then, from (1) and (2), δ( t) = β( t) and thus, from
(26), ˜ δ(t) = β. In that case, expected proﬁts from any given level of training with a contract,
˜  (k,c,0) in (29), are identical to those without a contract,  0 (k,c) in (13), for any given k
and c, so the optimal training level must also be the same.
By reducing the length of the contract, the training ﬁrm reduces the amount of the return to
training that goes as an external beneﬁt to the new employers of quitting workers because that
increases the length of the post-contract period (τ to T in Figure 1). However, it also reduces
the length of time during which the training ﬁrm receives returns to training, the period from 0
to τ in Figure 1. That, via (18), reduces the amount of training the ﬁrm provides. The optimal
length of contract trades off these two effects. The optimal length depends in general on the
form of the function g(c) about which we have little information. There is, however, one case,
the limiting one with no exogenous quits (ρ = 0), in which the optimal length of the contract
is independent of the form of the function g (c) and this case may be a useful guide for cases
in which efﬁcient turnover is low. For ρ = 0, recall that ˜ δ(t) = β. Then ˜ δ
 
(t) = 0 and, from
(31), the ﬁrst order condition derived from setting ∂ ˜  (k, ˜ c, S)/∂c = 0 can be written
βg  (˜ c) =
1
1 − γ
. (32)
Use of this in (20) with ρ = 0g i v e s
τ(˜ c) ≡−
1
r
ln
!
1 −rβ( 1 − γ)
"
. (33)
Thus values of τ(˜ c) can be calculated directly for given values of r, γ and T.( β is determined
by r and T.)
Some sample values are given in Table 1. For the calculations, we have used working life-
times of 25 and 40 years, which span what would seem reasonable historically given mortality
rates and the fact that people may change occupations, thus reducing the useful life of skills.
We have used real discount rates of 5%, 10% and 20% per year, since these need to allow for
depreciation of skills that we have not incorporated explicitly into the model. There is little
evidence on what would be reasonable values for γ, the proportion of the average value of
18T = 25 T = 40
r/γ 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9
5% pa 8.8 1.5 11.3 1.8
10% pa 6.1 1.0 6.8 1.0
20% pa 3.4 0.5 3.5 0.5
Table 1: Market apprenticeship length (years)
acquired skills a trainee can earn by quitting before the end of the contract. Acemoglu and
Pischke (1998, Table III) give point (but not very precise) estimates for Germany that complet-
ing an apprenticeship, but not staying with the training ﬁrm afterwards, adds between 0.024
and 0.041 to log wages. These can be interpreted as estimates of γg(c)/w0. Staying with
the training ﬁrm for the initial period after training adds another 0.012 to log wages, which
gives a point estimate for ¯ γg(c)/w0 of between 0.036 and 0.053. These ﬁgures suggest point
estimates for γ/¯ γ of between 2/3 and 3/4. Since ¯ γ>1, γ/¯ γ is a lower bound for γ. Because
these estimates are not very precise, we use values of 0.5 and 0.9 for γ in the table. It is clear
from the table that the calculations are not very sensitive to the working lifetime, particularly
with the higher discount rates, but differ a lot between the two values of γ.I t i s , h o w e v e r ,
reassuring that the contract lengths given in Table 1 encompass the lengths of apprenticeships
typically experienced historically.13
5 Regulation of training contracts
The previous section has shown that, even with a training contract, the amount of training ˜ c
and the number of workers trained in an unregulated market are less than the efﬁcient levels
whenever ρ and/or γ>0. This section discusses appropriate policies of regulation and subsidy
of training contracts under these circumstances. An obvious role for regulation is to monitor
training by, for example, regulating the curriculum of training programmes and setting tests of
competence. If this were 100% effective, it would make the amount of training veriﬁable and
theissuesdiscussed herewouldgoaway. Since, however, thereareinpracticemanydimensions
to quantity and quality of training, the cost of full monitoring may well be prohibitively high.
The issues discussed here then continue to apply to any aspect of training that is not fully
monitored by the regulator.
13Thereareanumberofwaysinwhichapprenticedworkerstraditionallysufferedgreaterpenaltiesfromquitting
than other workers, see Hamilton (1995). To the extent that these penalties reduce trainees’ ability to capture
returns from training, they can be incorporated into the model by a lower value of γ for apprenticed than for other
workers. In that case, ﬁrms make higher proﬁts with an apprenticeship than without one even with ρ = 0. There is
then an additional reason for the use of apprenticeships which reinforces that discussed here. Since the value of γ
in the period after the apprenticeship ends affects only wage differentials, not the amount of training or the length
of the apprenticeship, the optimal apprenticeship length is then given by the length in the table that corresponds to
the value of γ during the apprenticeship.
19One role for regulation is in trying to ensure that trainees lose out by quitting early, which is
analytically equivalent to reducing γ. The strict rules imposed by the medieval guilds against
working as a journeyman before completion of an apprenticeship would obviously have served
this purpose by preventing competitors competing away apprentices. For regulation of this
type, apprenticeships have the advantage that the rules need to be imposed only for the length
of the apprenticeship τ, not for the worker’s whole working life as in the case without a training
contract. But even if γ can be reduced to zero, this will still not achieve the efﬁcient level of
training as long as ρ>0.
Other policies that might be considered by government are regulation of the length of the
apprentice contract and a subsidy for some observable measure of training. There are two mar-
gins of concern to aregulator. The ﬁrst is theamount of training for each employee trained. The
second is the total number of employees trained. The regulator can affect the latter by offering
a lump sum subsidy per trainee that increases the proﬁts from training (29) and so, as can be
seen from (30), induce ﬁrms with higher ﬁxed costs of training to take on trainees. However,
a lump sum subsidy does not affect the training received by each trainee because it does not
affect the ﬁrst order condition derived from differentiating proﬁts (29) with respect to c.T h e
regulator cannot observe training but can indirectly inﬂuence the training each trainee receives
by regulating the length of training contract because there is a direct relationship between the
length of the contract and the amount of training via (18).14 However, the longest possible
length of contract is the whole working lifetime T and thus the highest amount of training con-
sistent with (18) is ¯ c deﬁned in (19). So ¯ c is an upper bound on the amount of training that can
be attained with these regulatory instruments.
Regulation of contract length is ineffective without at least some regulation of the wage.
Without wage regulation, the ﬁrm and the trainee could effectively evade regulation of contract
length because the ﬁrm could make the privately optimal contract nominally satisfy the regula-
tion by extending its length by the required amount, but with a wage in this extension equal to
the expectedtrained marginal product, and guaranteeing not to dismiss less good trainees. Such
evasion can be prevented by regulating the total wage payment over the whole contract to the
value of W given by (24) for the given regulated length and the value of c that satisﬁes (18).15
The formal regulation would then be that any ﬁrm wishing to pay more than the untrained wage
w0 to a worker who has not had a previous training contract must offer the regulated training
contract.16
There are also limitations on the amount of subsidy that can be paid. If the subsidy is large
14Alternatively, it can do so by offering a subsidy that increases with the length of training. It turns out that this
has no advantages over regulation of the contract length, so we do not pursue it here.
15In Germany, unions regulate pay of apprentices which can serve equally well. We are grateful to Daron
Acemoglu for pointing this out.
16If the regulationwerelimitedto those offeringtrainingcontracts, ﬁrmscouldchoose totrainwithout atraining
contract if that were more proﬁtable. To avoid that would require another constraint on regulation that we do not
explore here.
20enough, it will be worth ﬁrms with high training costs offering a training contract in order to
attract the subsidy even though they do not intend to train. To prevent that requires the amount
of the subsidy to be less than the difference between expected wages under a training contract
and expected wages to an untrained worker over the length of the training contract. That gives
a constraint on the maximum subsidy of
S ≤ W − δ[t (c)]w0 for S > 0. (34)
(Recall that S is deﬁned as the expected present discounted value at the start of a contract of
the subsidy paid at the end.)17 Substitution for W from (24) and use of the deﬁnition of ˜ δ(τ)
in (26) allows that constraint to be written
S ≤ g(c)
.
δ[τ (c)] − (1 − γ) ˜ δ [τ (c)]
/
for S > 0. (35)
With W ﬁxed, the ﬁrm chooses c to maximise its expected revenue less the training costs over
the regulated length of contract. That is the same c that maximises expected proﬁts given in
(25) for given τ and W and thus the relationship between the regulated length τ and the amount
of training c is simply the ﬁrst order condition (18). Given this, we can think in terms of the
regulator choosing c rather than τ and then use (18) to determine the contract length that must
be regulated in order to achieve that c. For any c ∈ [0, ¯ c], there is always a τ that implements
that c.
We assume the regulator wishes to maximise the social gains from training but, in the
conventional way, allowing for a proportional cost α of subsidies to account for distortions
arising from having to raise revenue from taxation. These gains can be represented in the
following way. The highest ﬁx e dc o s to ft r a i n i n gt h a ti ti sp r o ﬁtable for ﬁrms to incur when
training to level c with subsidy S is k (c, S) deﬁned in (30). The number of ﬁrms with ﬁxed cost
below this, and hence the number of workers trained, is F [k (c, S)]. The total social beneﬁt
from each worker trained consists of the additional lifetime value of output per trainee βg(c),
less the training cost c + k and the deadweight loss from the subsidy αS. Thus, the optimal
regulatory policy is (ˆ c, ˆ S) given by the solution to
max
S,c∈[0,¯ c]
F [k (c, S)]
!
βg(c) − c − αS
"
−
) k(c,S)
0
kdF (k) subject to (35), (36)
where the integral term is the total ﬁxed cost of training F [k (c, S)] workers.
Forthemoment, supposetheconstraint(35)isnotbindingandnotefrom(30)that∂k (c, S)/∂S =
17Regulating a wage W above that determined by the market would relax this constraint but not in a way that is
helpful to the regulator. The only reason to offer a subsidy is to induce ﬁrms with higher ﬁxed costs of training to
train. Raising the wage has the opposite effect. It is the difference between S and W that determines the highest
ﬁxed cost for which it is proﬁtable to train. Thus raising W does not relax the constraint in a way that enables the
regulator to increase the number of workers trained.
211. The ﬁrst order conditions for an interior solution to this problem, with k1 (c, S) denoting the
derivative of k (c, S) with respect c,a r et h e n
−αF[k(ˆ c, ˆ S)] + dF[k(ˆ c, ˆ S)]
’
βg
#
ˆ c
$
−ˆ c − α ˆ S − k(ˆ c, ˆ S)
(
= 0 (37)
!
βg (ˆ c) − 1
"
F[k(ˆ c, ˆ S)] + k1(ˆ c, ˆ S)dF[k(ˆ c, ˆ S)]
’
βg
#
ˆ c
$
−ˆ c − α ˆ S − k(ˆ c, ˆ S)
(
= 0. (38)
Sufﬁcient (but not necessary) conditions for the second order conditions for a maximum to be
satisﬁed are that k1(ˆ c, ˆ S)<0a n dd2F
’
k(ˆ c, ˆ S)
(
≤ 0.
The intuition behind (37) is as follows. The marginal cost to a subsidy for given training
ˆ c is the welfare loss α from the additional subsidy for each of the F[k(ˆ c, ˆ S)] workers trained.
The marginal beneﬁt is that dF[k(ˆ c, ˆ S)] more ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to train, which increases
welfare by the difference between the returns to training, βg
#
ˆ c
$
, and the cost of the training
both in resources ˆ c + k(ˆ c, ˆ S) and in the deadweight loss from the subsidy, α ˆ S. The optimal
subsidy balances these two. The marginal beneﬁt of the training received by each trainee for
given ˆ S is the difference between the marginal returns to expenditure on training βg  #
ˆ c
$
and
its cost of 1, multiplied by the number of workers trained F[k(ˆ c, ˆ S)]. That is the ﬁr s tt e r mi n
(38). The marginal cost is that increasing training above the proﬁt maximizing level reduces
the proﬁts from training, so dF[k(ˆ c, ˆ S)]k1(ˆ c, ˆ S) fewer ﬁrms train and there is a welfare loss
of the difference between the returns to training, βg
#
ˆ c
$
, and the cost of the training both in
resources ˆ c + k(ˆ c, ˆ S) and in the deadweight loss from the subsidy, α ˆ S. The optimal amount of
training balances these two effects. Our ﬁrst result on regulation follows directly from (38).
Proposition 4 For any given subsidy S (including S = 0) that with unregulated contracts
satisﬁes the constraint (35), social welfare is increased by regulating a longer contract, and
thereby achieving a higher training per worker, than would be set without such regulation.
Proof. Suppose contract length is not regulated. Then ﬁrms choose a contract length that
results in training c that maximises ˜  (k,c, S) in (29) for any given S. It follows from (29)
and (30) that k1(c, S) = ∂ ˜  (k,c, S)/∂c. Thus, in the absence of regulation of contract length,
training is at a level ˜ c for which k1(˜ c, S) = 0. (We know from Proposition 3 that the contract
is for less than the whole lifetime so that the optimum is interior with ˜ c < ¯ c. Note that ˜ c is
actually independent of S.) At any such ˜ c, therefore, the second term in (38) is zero. However,
the ﬁrst term would be strictly positive—it would be zero only for the ﬁrst best level of training
c∗ deﬁned in (4) and we showed in Proposition 3 that training without regulation ˜ c is less than
c∗. Thus, no such ˜ c can satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition (38). Moreover, the left hand side
of (38) is the effect on welfare of an increase in c. That this left hand side is strictly positive
implies that social welfare is increased by increasing c from any ˜ c that results in the absence of
regulation.
Given ˜ c < ¯ c, such an increase in c is feasible as long as it does not violate the maximum
subsidy constraint (35). For S = 0, that constraint does not apply. For S > 0, that constraint
22can besatisﬁed at the unregulated contract length only if theright handsideisstrictly positive at
˜ c. When, however, the right hand side of (35) is positive, its derivative with respect to c is also
positive. Thus the constraint cannot become binding as regulated contract length is increased
above the unregulated contract length.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The number of workers trained is determined by
the expected proﬁt from training. At the proﬁt maximizing amount of training, a small change
in that amount has only a second order effect on expected proﬁt and, hence, only a second
order effect on the number trained. But it has a ﬁrst order effect on the training received by
each trainee and, because of the externalities, this has a ﬁrst order effect on social welfare.18
This result has an interesting implication. In practice, there are administrative costs in
setting up a subsidy system that may have been too high to be worthwhile to, for example,
medieval and Tudor government authorities. A government with no mechanism for paying
subsidies, or a regulator who has no tax raising powers, will nevertheless wish to regulate
the length of training. The model is, therefore, consistent with the historically widespread
regulation of apprenticeships even when training is not subsidised.19
When there is a subsidy to training, (37) and (38) together imply
βg (ˆ c) − 1 + αk1(ˆ c, ˆ S) = 0, (39)
which, sincek1(c, S)isactuallyindependentof S, determines ˆ c, thoughnotnecessarilyuniquely
if k1(c, S) is not monotone decreasing in c. The corresponding subsidy ˆ S can then be calcu-
lated for any distribution F (k) from (37) which, with substitution for k(ˆ c, ˆ S) from (30), can be
written in the form
dF
’
k(ˆ c, ˆ S)
(
F
’
k(ˆ c, ˆ S)
(
.
g
#
ˆ c
$’
β − (1 − γ) ˜ δ
#
τ
#
ˆ c
$$(
− (1 + α) ˆ S
/
= α. (40)
For given ˆ c a n da n yd i s t r i b u t i o no fk for which dF(k)/F (k) is monotone decreasing (a hazard
rate assumption that is standard in contract theory, see Laffont and Tirole (1993, p. 66), and
is satisﬁed by most of the usual distributions), there is a unique value of ˆ S that satisﬁes (40).
In other cases, if there is more than one value of ˆ S that satisﬁes (40) or ˆ c that satisﬁes (39), a
18Although social welfare is increased by increasing contract length from the unregulated level, we have not
been able to show that the global regulated optimum always has a longer contract than an unregulated market for
the general form of the function g(c) used here. However, it certainly does if g(c) takes a constant elasticity form
or if ρ is sufﬁciently small. We have not found examples in which it does not.
19The same conclusion applies even if the regulator is controlled by ﬁrms and thus wishes to maximize the total
expected proﬁts of all ﬁrms. The reason is that, because of the externality derived by non-training ﬁrms when
trained workers quit for exogenous reasons, an unregulated market does not maximize total expected proﬁts of all
ﬁrms. The model is thus also consistent with medieval guilds regulating the length of apprenticeships even before
government authorities did so.
23further check must be used to establish which is a global maximum.20
When the deadweight cost of taxation gets large (α →∞ ), (40) cannot be satisﬁed with
equality and we have the corner solution with ˆ S = 0. The maximum subsidy constraint (35)
does not apply when S = 0, sothis solution is optimal. Theotherextremeis no deadweight cost
to raising funds via taxation (α = 0). To satisfy (39) would then require ˆ c = c∗,t h ee f ﬁcient
level deﬁned by (4). But that is not possible whenever there are exogenous quits (ρ>0)
because the maximum training the regulator can induce (corresponding to τ = T)i s¯ c < c∗.
Thus we have the corner solution with ˆ c =¯ c, corresponding to a lifetime training contract.
In this case, however, the maximum subsidy condition (35) always binds. This can be seen as
follows. From (28) we know that ˜ δ(T) = δ(T) ≡ δ. Thus, for ˆ c =¯ c and hence τ = T, (35)
is satisﬁed only if S ≤ δγg(¯ c). But then, with α = 0, (40) implies ˆ S = g(¯ c)
!
β − (1 − γ)δ
"
which, since β>δwhen ρ>0, does not satisfy the maximum subsidy constraint. Because,
however, that constraint cannot be relaxed by reducing c and because c cannot be increased
above ¯ c, it is nevertheless optimal to set ˆ c =¯ c and ˆ S = δγg (¯ c).From (30) we then have
k(ˆ c, ˆ S) = δg(¯ c) −¯ c.T h i si sl e s st h a nt h ee f ﬁcient level k∗
1 deﬁned in (5). Thus, despite there
being no deadweight cost to taxation, both the number of workers trained and the amount of
training received by each trainee are below the efﬁcient levels.
This raises the obvious question of whether the regulator could do better with some other
kind of regulation of training contracts. It is not, however, obvious what regulation would do
better. It is clear from (25) that a wage bill W that is decreasing in c for given τ would induce
more investment for a given contract length. However, because c is non-contractible, it is not
clear how such an arrangement could be implemented.
In the limiting case with no exogenous quits (ρ = 0), the optimal regulatory solution has a
particularly simple form that may be a useful guide for cases in which efﬁcient turnover is low.
For ρ = 0, (39) reduces to
βg  #
ˆ c
$
=
1
1 − α
1+αγ
, (41)
which determines ˆ c uniquely. The regulated length of apprenticeship ˆ τ that corresponds to ˆ c is
given by use of (41) in (20),
ˆ τ =−
1
r
ln
,
1 −rβ
0
1 −
α
1 + α
γ
1-
. (42)
Moreover, in this case the maximum subsidy constraint (35) is never binding at an optimum.
20This argument has ignored the maximum subsidy constraint (35). As shown in the proof of Proposition 4,
however, when the right hand side of (35) is positive (a necessary condition for the constraint to be satisﬁed), its
derivative with respect to c is also positive. Thus one cannot relax the constraint by reducing c. The implication is
that the optimal level ˆ c is at least as large as that implied by (39).
24α = 0.5 α = 1 α = 2
r/γ 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9
5% pa 25.5 18.6 20.9 12.9 17.2 8.5
10% pa 17.0 11.6 13.3 7.8 10.6 5.0
20% pa 9.0 6.0 6.9 4.0 5.5 2.6
Table 2: Optimal regulated apprenticeship length (years), working lifetime 40 years
To see this, note that, from (40),
ˆ S ≤
γβg
#
ˆ c
$
1 + α
. (43)
Thus (35) is satisﬁed as long as
β
!
τ
#
ˆ c
$"
β
− (1 − γ) ≥
γ
1 + α
. (44)
But (18) and (39) imply that this condition holds with equality and hence the optimal solution
always satisﬁes (35).
In this case, the optimal regulated length of training ˆ τ in (42) is independent of the form
of the training function g(.) and the distribution function F (.). Some sample values of ¯ τ for
T = 40 years, r and γ as in Table 1, and values for α o f0 . 5 ,1 ,a n d2a r eg i v e ni nT a b l e2 .F o r
the low values of all the parameters in the table, the contract lengths look on the high side but
for higher values are of orders of magnitude observed historically. The Elizabethan Statute of
Artiﬁcers of 1563 regulated apprenticeships to 7 years in England, see Bindoff (1950, p. 201).
In modern day Germany apprenticeships for a wide variety of occupations last 3-4 years, see
Soskice (1994).
The general conclusion from this section is that regulation of contract length is always
optimal even if subsidising training has too high a deadweight cost, or is otherwise too difﬁcult,
to be worthwhile. An unregulated market provides too little training because both trainees and
the new employers of trainees who quit capture some part of the returns to the training ﬁrm’s
investment in training. This part of the returns is still a social beneﬁt from training even though
not a private beneﬁt to the training ﬁrm. Regulation takes account of that.
6 Alternative views and historical evidence
In the model in this paper, general training by ﬁrms is provided within an apprenticeship type
system in order to mitigate the market failure that arises when the amount of training cannot
be speciﬁed contractually in advance. Instead, the length of the apprenticeship is speciﬁed
contractually in advance, rather than being determined by each apprentice’s ability to perform
the speciﬁc tasks required of a skilled worker. The model also provides a welfare-enhancing
25role for policy towards apprenticeships. Historically, it has certainly been the case that much
general training undertaken in the workplace has occurred within the context of a formal ap-
prentice system with its duration speciﬁedcontractually in advance—for example, the mØtier in
France, arte in Italy, Amt, Innung, Zunft or Handwerk in Germany, and craft guild in England.
Contemporary training of lawyers, doctors and accountants also typically involves a speciﬁed
duration of training on the job that is not reduced just because a trainee is quicker than average
at acquiring the appropriate skills. Moreover, there is a long history of regulation of apprentice-
ships, certainly from medieval times onward, see Pirenne (1936). In England, this was put on a
nationwide statutory basis by the Elizabethan Statute of Artiﬁcers in 1563, see Bindoff (1959,
p. 201).
Reasons other than those modelled here have been suggested for these characteristics. The
most notable are that (a) apprenticeships are a device to create monopoly rents by controlling
thesupply ofskilled workers, and that (b)they are a way ofovercoming worker’slimitedaccess
to capital to pay for general training within Becker’s (1964) human capital framework. There
are, however, a number of historical features of apprenticeships that are not easily reconciled
with these hypotheses.
Consider ﬁrst the view that formal apprenticeships are a device to create monopoly rents by
controlling the supply of skilled workers. Smith (1887, Book 1, Ch. 8) discussed extensively
the view that apprenticeships acted as a way for craftsmen to control access to their trade in
order to increase their earnings. He argued that a long period of apprenticeship unnecessar-
ily raises the cost of becoming skilled, thereby artiﬁcially reducing the skilled labour supply.
Certainly, regulation reducing the numbers entering skilled trades would have controlled the
supply of skilled workers. Two things, however, suggest that this was not the only reason for
apprenticeships. First, that purpose would have been served simply by regulating the length of
training andwhocouldprovideit. Infact, therewasalso extensiveregulationoftheadequacy of
training. The craft guilds of the middle ages had supervisory functions that included the right of
search to ensure that good materials and appropriate processes of manufacture were employed,
and that masters “took measure to secure that workmen should be properly trained by serving
a regular apprenticeship, and they made rules affecting the hours of labour and well-being of
those employed” (Cunningham and McArthur, 1920, p.61). Moreover, in modern Germany a
range of institutions funded collectively by ﬁrms oversee the working of the apprentice system
(Harhoff and Kane, 1993; Steedman, 1993; Soskice, 1994); and in the UK the Industrial Train-
ing Boards monitor industrial training. Second, one would expect apprenticeships to decline in
importance once craft guilds consisting of skilled workers lost control of the numbers admitted
to apprenticeships. While apprenticeship declined in Britain after the repeal of the Statute of
Artiﬁcers in 1814, the diminished institution in fact continued into the mid-twentieth century,
long after an apprenticeship was required to sell skilled labour services. Indeed, not only did
apprenticeship survive, but it expanded into the new twentieth century industries that had not
26existed in 1814 and were not, apparently at least, controlled by their skilled workers.
Consider now limited access to capital by workers. In Becker’s (1964) analysis of human
capital, it is efﬁcient for workers to pay for general training and apprenticeships at a low wage
are an obvious way for ﬁrms to recoup the cost of training from employees who may not
have ready access to capital markets to pay for their own training in advance. Elbaum (1989)
argues on the basis of statements from contemporaries, estimates of training costs, and the
“extraordinarily large pay increases” on completion of apprenticeship, that the later stages of
apprenticeship in early twentieth century Britain were indeed playing the role of enabling ﬁrms
to recoup costs of training. If, however, apprenticeships were only about ensuring that workers
pay for general training, there would be no obvious role for regulation apart from enforcing
the agreements reached privately between workers and training ﬁrms. In fact regulation went
far beyond this. As already noted, apprenticeship length was regulated in the middle ages and
given a statutory basis in Elizabethan England by the Statute of Artiﬁcers. Moreover, there was
extensive regulation of the adequacy of training. More recently, subsidies have been used to
encourage training, for example the Youth Training Programmes in the UK, see Dolton (1993).
Within the Becker framework, government ﬁnancial inducements to undertake training may be
appropriate if workers have higher discount rates than ﬁrms, with the result that the enforced
low consumption during training at low wages implies a signiﬁcant utility loss. However,
the natural policy under these circumstances would be to make loans available to employees
for on-the-job training, and that has not been the typical form of ﬁnancial support used in
practice, seeDolton (1993) for the UK and Lynch (1993) for the US. Moreover, apprenticeships
have been used not only for artisan professions but also in the medical, legal and accounting
professions for the younger offspring of middle class and wealthy families who were often
wealthy enough to pay for general training directly, see Earle (1989, ch. 3). For all these
reasons, it seems unlikely that trainees’ limited access to capital was the primary reason for the
use of apprenticeships.
In contrast, regulation of both length and adequacy of training contracts makes sense within
themodeldeveloped here. Elbaum(1989, p. 344)in hisdiscussion ofapprenticeships in Britain
is explicit about the problem of ensuring that ﬁrms deliver on training promises: “youths who
sacriﬁced current wages in return for the promise of training were generally vulnerable to ex-
ploitation by employers who failed to live up to their training commitments.” The extensive
use of institutions to set and monitor standards of training is indicative that contractual en-
forcement of standards by individual trainees appealing to courts is not straightforward. That
non-contracted considerations were important is indicated by the extensive evidence that poten-
tial apprentices and their parents placed central emphasis on the moral character of the master,
resorting where possible to a relative, see (Earle, 1989). The more that efﬁcient standards
can be enforced either in this way or by the direct regulation of the curriculum as in modern
Germany, the less the welfare loss in the model from underprovision of training by the market.
27Moreover, within the model, regulation of length of apprenticeships is a welfare enhancing way
to move market provision of training closer to the efﬁcient level. Thus both these dimensions
of regulation have an obvious role within the model developed here.
As well as being consistent with the institutional structures accompanying training, the
model analysed here predicts that wages of trainees staying with their training ﬁrm after the
end of their apprenticeship (a) increase to the value of their marginal product from a level be-
low marginal product during the ﬁnal stage of their apprenticeship, and (b) are, ceteris paribus,
higher than wages of those who change employer. There is considerable evidence supporting
point (a), for example, the extraordinarily large pay increases on completion of apprenticeship
documented by Elbaum (1989). Careful evidence on point (b) is rare and made problematic
by the heterogeneity in types of skills and observable characteristics of those completing ap-
prenticeships. However, in a regression study of German apprentices, Acemoglu and Pischke
(1998) ﬁnd that, within occupations, retained workers earn more than those leaving for another
non-military job.
7 Concluding remarks
When the amount of training is not contractible and ﬁrms have costs of training that are un-
known to workers, workers will not pay directly for the full cost of general training even if they
have access to funds to do so. We have shown that, when in addition workers are free to quit
without penalty and some do so, apprenticeships are an institution that enables ﬁrms to capture
more of the returns to the general training they provide. This applies even if training with an
apprenticeship is no more effective at preventing employees quitting than training without one.
Thus there remains a case for using apprenticeships even where they confer no advantage in
preventing rival ﬁrms bidding away trainees. The model developed here captures many of the
salient characteristics of traditional on-the-job general training. Moreover, it has implications
for the analysis of policy. We have shown that it is in general efﬁcient to regulate the length of
apprenticeships and, if the deadweight loss from raising funds through taxation is sufﬁciently
low, to subsidise their completion.
The model has been kept simple for expositional reasons but the basic insights do not de-
pend on that. One obvious simpliﬁcation concerns the timing of training during the apprentice-
ship period. In the model developed here, all training takes place straightaway at the start of
the training contract. The rest of the training contract is to enable the ﬁrm to recoup the cost
of training. There are, however, two reasons why ﬁrms may not wish to provide all training
straightaway. The ﬁrst follows from the standard assumption in human capital theory that a
given amount of training is more effective if spread out over a longer period of time. The sec-
ond follows from the result in the model that the binding constraint for trainee quitting is at the
start of the training period. Thus ﬁrms could provide some training later in the training period
28without making this crucial constraint tighter. Delaying training for either reason, of course,
reduces the period over which the ﬁrm can recoup the cost of training and the optimal timing
would have to balance the two effects, but one would expect at least some training to occur
after the start of the training period.
Other obvious simpliﬁcations are that we have assumed the environment is stationary with
no uncertainty except about the types of trainees, and that ﬁrms do not build reputations for
providing levels of training beyond their immediate short term interest. These are not, however,
crucial to the underlying insights. If labour productivity grew at a constant proportional rate
for exogenous reasons unrelated to training, that would enter the model like a reduction in the
discount rate. Moreover, if there were uncertainty about the return to training for a given type
of trainee, one could simply interpret the return to training as the expected return at the time the
training was given. Finally, even if information ﬂows are sufﬁcient to enable ﬁrms to develop
reputations for providing good training, such reputations are worth maintaining only for those
with ﬁxed costs of training sufﬁciently low that their proﬁts from training in the future are
high enough to keep them honest in the short term. In particular, reputations will never keep
marginally proﬁtable ﬁrms honest, so the market will still provide too little training and the role
for government policy remains.
It thus seems that the underlying insights in the model presented here are reasonably robust
to these types of generalization of the model. Those insights are also consistent with much of
the historical evidence on general training provided by ﬁrms. They therefore seem a promising
basis for further analysis.
Appendices
A The payoff to trainees who quit
This appendix sets out a game for the hiring process with hiring at discrete time intervals that is
consistent with the employment model in the main text. It shows that the expression in (7) for
the remaining lifetime earnings of a trainee who quits is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoff
of a trainee who quits as the time interval between hiring dates goes to zero.
For simplicity, consider 1 worker and m ﬁrms, each with one vacancy, plus the training ﬁrm
that hires and trains the worker at date 0. Divide the worker’s working lifetime [0,T]i n t oa
large number N of equally spaced intermediate hiring dates at which job offers can be made,
the interval between them being dt = T/(N + 1).T h eﬁrst hiring date at which a non-training
ﬁrm can make an offer is thus t = dt, the training ﬁrm being the incumbent employer at this
date. The worker works continuously between hiring dates at the wage agreed with the current
employer at the most recent hiring date. She quits at the next hiring date for exogenous reasons
with a probability that corresponds to the rate ρ during a period of employment. Thus, at each
29Player to move Moves Information Set
Stage n.1 Nature 1. Determines whether worker quits for exogenous reasons
2. Informs employing ﬁrm of worker’s type
Stage n.2 Firms with vacancies Offer wage to allocated worker Worker’s training level & wage history
(simultaneously)
Stage n.3 Firm with worker Counter-offer wage to incumbent worker 1. Worker’s training level & wage history
2. Worker’s type
3. Offers made to worker at stage n.2
Stage n.4 Worker Accept no offer (& quit market) or offer of 1 ﬁrm from: 1. Own training level & wage history
1. outside offers, if quitting for exogenous reasons 2. Offers made at stage n.2 and n.3
2. all offers, otherwise
Table 3: Stage game at stage n
hiring date, the probability the worker quits no matter what offer the current employer makes
is 1 − e−ρdt. Whatever the reason for a quit, the new employer incurs a once-off hiring cost
ε>0.
At each date ndt at which job offers can be made, the following stage game is played. First,
at stage n.1, Nature determines whether the worker decides to quit for exogenous reasons (an
event that has probability 1 − e−ρdt) and informs the current employing ﬁrm of the worker’s
type. At stage n.2, the m ﬁrms with vacancies each make a simultaneous wage offer to the
worker. Each ﬁrm knows what wage the worker has received at each previous stage, that is, the
worker’s wage history. With wt denoting the wage at t, the wage history at date t = ndt for
some n is denoted by the n−1 dimensional vector of real numbers wt = (w0,w dt,...,w t−dt).
It does not know the worker’s type.21 At stage n.3, the currently employing ﬁrm makes a
counter-offer to the worker. The ﬁrm knows the worker’s wage history, the worker’s type, and
the offers made at stage n.2. Finally, at stage n.4, the worker either accepts the wage offer
of one ﬁrm or accepts no offer. If accepting no offer, the worker leaves the labour market
permanently and receives a payoff at the rate u <w 0 + γg (c) for subsequent stages. If the
worker is quitting for exogenous reasons, the offer accepted must be from an outside ﬁrm.
Otherwise it can be from any ﬁrm. At this stage, the worker knows her own wage history and
the offers made to her at stages n.3a n dn.4. The stage game is summarised in Table 3.
For describing payoffs and strategies in the game, we use the following notation. Since all
ﬁrms know the worker’s level of training c, we can simplify notation by denoting the produc-
tivity of a better worker (type ¯ γ)b y¯ z (= w0 +¯ γg (c)), that of a less good worker (type γ)b y
z (= w0 + γg(c)). The ﬂow payoff to a ﬁrm from employing a worker of type z ∈
%
z, ¯ z
&
at
wage wt from t to t + dt is (z − wt)dt, that from not employing a worker is zero. The ﬂow
payoff to the worker is wtdt. The structure of the game, and the payoffs conditional on worker
21This formulation requires that a ﬁrm forgets the worker’s type when the worker quits its employment. This
simpliﬁes the formal model by ensuring that no more than one ﬁrm knows the worker’s type at any hiring date.
We discuss implications of relaxing this requirement later.
30type, are common knowledge.
Strategies in the game can be described as follows. The strategy component at t for each
ﬁrm f ∈ {1,...,m + 1} conditional on having a vacancy at t is a mapping from the wage
history wt to a real number that corresponds to a wage offer, denoted w
f
t
#
wt$
.T h a tf o re a c h
ﬁrm i ∈ {1,...,m + 1} conditional on employing the worker at t − dt is a mapping from the
worker’s type z, the wage history wt,a n dt h ew a g eo f f e r sb yﬁrms with vacancies at t which
(with some abuse of notation) we denote {w
f
t , f  = i} to a real number that again corresponds
to a wage offer, denoted ˆ wi
t(z,wt,{w
f
t , f  = i}). The strategy for the worker at t employed
by ﬁrm i at t − dt is a mapping from the wage history wt, the offers by ﬁrms with vacancies
at t {w
f
t , f  = i}, and the counter-offer by ﬁrm i, denoted (again with some abuse of notation)
ˆ wi
t,t ot h es e to fi n t e g e r s{0,1,...,m + 1} if not quitting for exogenous reasons and to the set
of integers {0,1,...,i − 1,i + 1,...,m + 1} if quitting for exogenous reasons. The integer
chosen identiﬁes the ﬁrm whose offer is accepted, with 0 denoting that no offer is accepted and
t h ew o r k e ri sl e a v i n gt h el a b o u rm a r k e t .W ed e n o t et h ew o r k e r ’s strategy component at t when
currently employed by ﬁrm i by ai
t(wt,{w
f
t , f  = i}, ˆ wi
t),i ∈ {1,...,m + 1}. The complete
strategy space for all players is denoted S, a proﬁle of strategies (one for each player) by S ∈ S.
To demonstrate the result in (7), we show that the wage path wt = z for all t ∈ (0,T]
is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the continuous version of this game (as dt → 0) as the
number of ﬁrms with vacancies m →∞and the hiring cost ε → 0. For this demonstration,
we use the following notation. Let w+
t = (wt+dt,w t+2dt,...,w T−dt) be a wage path after
t.L e t  ∗
t
#
z,w t,w+
t
$
denote the expected proﬁts a ﬁrm receives from t on from having in
post a worker of type z ∈
%
z, ¯ z
&
when the wage path
#
wt,w+
t
$
is followed from t on and the
worker quits only for exogenous reasons. Also let ¯  t
#
wt,w+
t
$
denote the expected present
discounted value of proﬁts for a ﬁrm that starts period t with a vacancy in an equilibrium with
future wage path
#
wt,w+
t
$
in which the worker quits only for exogenous reasons and the ﬁrm’s
belief is that the worker is type ¯ z with probability p. Note from the deﬁnition of w+
t that
w+
t =
#
wt+dt,w+
t+2dt
$
, so we can use ¯  t+dt
#
w+
t
$
and ¯  t+dt
#
wt+dt,w+
t+dt
$
interchangeably.
Then ¯  t
#
wt,w+
t
$
can be written
¯  t
#
wt,w+
t
$
= max
2
e−rdt ¯  t+dt
#
w+
t
$
,
1 − e−ρdt
m
!
p ∗
t
#
¯ z,w t,w+
t
$
+ (1 − p) ∗
t
#
z,w t,w+
t
$
− ε
"
+
0
1 −
1 − e−ρdt
m
1
e−rdt ¯  t+dt
#
w+
t
$
3
, for t ∈ {dt,2dt,...,T − dt}, (45)
= e−rdt ¯  t+dt
#
w+
t
$
+
1 − e−ρdt
m
max
2
0,
!
p ∗
t
#
¯ z,w t,w+
t
$
+ (1 − p) ∗
t
#
z,w t,w+
t
$
−ε] − e−rdt ¯  t+dt
#
w+
t
$
3
, for t ∈ {dt,2dt,...,T − dt}, (46)
31with ¯  T
#
w+
T−dt
$
= 0. The ﬁrst term in braces in (45) is the expected proﬁts from having a
vacancy at t + dt, namely ¯  t+dt
#
w+
t
$
, discounted back to t.A ﬁrm with a vacancy cannot
do worse than this because it can always offer a wage that will never be accepted, earn zero
proﬁti np e r i o dt and then retain the vacancy until t + 1. The second term in braces in (45)
is constructed as follows. With probability 1 − e−ρdt the worker will quit at t for exogenous
reasons. With m outside ﬁrms all bidding the same highest wage wt, each has probability
1/m of acquiring the worker if the worker quits for exogenous reasons. With probability p the
worker has high productivity ¯ z yielding expected future proﬁt  ∗
t
#
¯ z,w t,w+
t
$
, with probability
1 − p low productivity z yielding expected future proﬁt  ∗
t
#
z,w t,w+
t
$
. In either case, the
successful hiring ﬁrm incurs the hiring cost ε. The remaining term consists of the probability
of not successfully hiring the worker multiplied by the expected proﬁts from having a vacancy
at t + dt constructed as before. Since the game ends at T, it is necessarily the case that
¯  T
#
w+
T−dt
$
= 0. Note that, in evaluating ¯  t
#
wt,w+
t
$
and  ∗
t
#
z,w t,w+
t
$
,w ed on o tn e e dt o
keep track of the number of ﬁrms with vacancies that actually bid wt. Consider ¯  t
#
wt,w+
t
$
.I f
¯  t
#
wt,w+
t
$
> e−rdt ¯  t+dt
#
w+
t
$
, it is necessarily strictly optimal for all m to do so. If, on the
other hand, ¯  t
#
wt,w+
t
$
= e−rdt ¯  t+dt
#
w+
t
$
, it makes no difference to the proﬁth o wm a n y
do so. Now consider  ∗
t
#
z,w t,w+
t
$
.W ec a nw r i t e ∗
t
#
z,w t,w+
t
$
as
 ∗
t
#
z,w t,w+
t
$
=
(T−t)/dt 4
k=1
e−(r+ρ)(T−t−kdt)
2
(z − wT−kdt)
+ eρdte−rdt#
1 − e−ρdt$
¯  T−(k−1)dt
*
wT−(k−1)dt,w+
T−(k−1)dt
+
3
,
for t ∈ {dt,2dt,...,T − dt}. (47)
This is constructed as follows. With probability e−ρ(T−t−kdt), the worker has not quit by T −
kdt so the ﬁrm receives proﬁt z − wT−kdt for that period, discounted by the discount factor
e−r(T−t−kdt). With probability e−ρ(T−t−(k+1)dt) #
1 − e−ρdt$
, the worker has not quit by T −
(k + 1)dt but quits at T − kdt. In that event, the ﬁrm starts period T − (k − 1)dt without a
worker with expected payoff ¯  T−(k−1)dt
*
wT−(k−1)dt,w+
T−(k−1)dt
+
that is discounted by the
factor e−r(T−t−(k−1)dt). Thus, since we do not need to keep track of the number of bidding
ﬁrms in ¯  t
#
wt,w+
t
$
, we do not need to do so in  ∗
t
#
z,w t,w+
t
$
either.
Next, deﬁne w
#
w+
t
$
and ¯ w
#
w+
t
$
by
w
#
w+
t
$
= supw such that  ∗
t
#
z,w,w+
t
$
≥ e−rdt ¯  t+dt
#
w+
t
$
, for t ∈ {dt,2dt,...,T − dt},
(48)
¯ w
#
w+
t
$
= supw such that  ∗
t
#
¯ z,w,w+
t
$
≥ e−rdt ¯  t+dt
#
w+
t
$
, for t ∈ {dt,2dt,...,T − dt}.
(49)
These are the highest wages a ﬁrm would be prepared to pay to retain a worker of type z and
32¯ z respectively at t given the future wage path w+
t .S i n c e ¯ z > z, it follows from (47) that
¯ w
#
w+
t
$
>w
#
w+
t
$
. Also, let w0 #
w+
t
$
denote the lowest wage the worker will accept rather
than leave the market given the future wage path w+
t . Finally on notation, let p f #
wt$
denote
the probability assessment of ﬁrm f with a vacancy that a worker with wage history wt is a
better worker, that is, has productivity ¯ z rather than z.
To demonstratethat thespeciﬁedwagepath is aperfectBayesianequilibrium, weusestrate-
gies that consist of the following responses.
Deﬁnition 1 The response of a ﬁrm with a vacancy at t is Bertrand if it offers the worker the
highest wage at which the expected present value of its future proﬁts is non-negative.
Deﬁnition 2 Suppose w+
t is an equilibrium wage path from t + dt on. An employing ﬁrm’s
response at t is matching if, at stage n.3 for n = t, the ﬁrm offers a worker of type z: (1)
a wage w that matches the higher of w0 #
w+
t
$
and the best outside offer if  ∗
t
#
z,w,w+
t
$
≥
e−rdt ¯  t+dt
#
w+
t
$
; (2) any wage strictly less than w otherwise.
Deﬁnition 3 Suppose w+
t is an equilibrium wage path from t + dt on. Theworker’s response
at t is myopic if, at stage n.4 for n = t, the worker accepts the highest wage w from among
those available if w ≥ w0 #
w+
t
$
and no offer if w<w 0 #
w+
t
$
.
Deﬁnition 4 The worker’s response at t is non-discriminating if the following conditions hold.
(1) If not quitting for exogenous reasons at t, the worker stays with the current employer if the
current employer has matched the best outside offer. (2) When quitting at t, the worker chooses
a new employer by randomising with equal probabilities between the best equal outside offers.
This last response is non-discriminating in the sense that the worker treats equally all ﬁrms
with vacancies that make equally good offers.
WenextshowthatstrategiesconsistingoftheBertrand, matchingandmyopic/non-discriminating
responses for, respectively, ﬁrms with vacancies, the employing ﬁrm, and the worker form a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium for off-equilibrium-path beliefs that are reasonable in the follow-
ing sense.
Deﬁnition 5 Suppose the worker has wage path (w0,...,w T−dt) in a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium. The beliefs of ﬁr m f w i t hav a c a n c yi np e r i o dt+ 1 are reasonable if (1) for a
wage at t of w  <w t,p f #
wt,w $
≤ p f #
wt,w t
$
, and (2) for a wage at t of w  >w t,
p f #
wt,w $
≥ p f #
wt,w t
$
.
For stating the result, it is useful to deﬁne the function G
#
w,w+
t
$
by
Gt
#
w,w+
t
$
= p ∗
t
#
¯ z,w t,w+
t
$
+ (1 − p) ∗
t
#
z,w t,w+
t
$
− ε − e−rdt ¯  t+dt
#
w+
t
$
,
for t ∈ {dt,2dt,...,T − dt}. (50)
33This is the gain in expected future proﬁts of a ﬁrm with a vacancy that acquires, at date t and
wage w, a worker who is type ¯ z with probability p over the expected future proﬁts it would
make if it did not acquire the worker at t.
Proposition 5 Strategies consisting of the Bertrand, matching and myopic/non-discriminating
responses for, respectively, ﬁrms with vacancies, theemployingﬁrm, andtheworker forma per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium with reasonable beliefs for dt sufﬁciently small. For the wage path
wt in any such equilibrium, the following properties hold for all t ∈ {dt,2dt,...,T − dt}:
1. p f #
wt$
= p for all ﬁrms f with vacancies at t.
2. If there exists a w ∈
!
w0 #
w+
t
$
,w
#
w+
t
$"
such that Gt
#
w,w+
t
$
≥ 0:
wt = maxw ∈
’
w0 #
w+
t
$
,w
#
w+
t
$(
such that Gt
#
w,w+
t
$
≥ 0. (51)
3. If there exists no w ∈
!
w0 #
w+
t
$
,w
#
w+
t
$"
such that Gt
#
w,w+
t
$
≥ 0:
wt = w0 #
w+
t
$
. (52)
Proof. Consider the last hiring period n = T − dt. With no future to be concerned
about, the unique best response of the worker at stage n.4 is clearly the myopic response of
accepting the offer with the highest wage w for period T − dt from among those available, or
no offer if w<u. It cannot do better than by being non-discriminatory. Thus the myopic/non-
discriminatory response is a best response at T −dt. Also with no future to be concerned about,
¯  T
#
w+
T−dt
$
= 0. Thus, a best response at stage n.3 for the incumbent employer, given that
it knows the worker’s productivity z, is the matching response of offering w that matches the
higher of the worker’s reservation wage u and the best outside offer if  ∗
T−dt
#
z,w,w+
T−dt
$
≥
0, or any wage offer less than that w if  ∗
T−dt
#
z,w,w+
T−dt
$
< 0.
Consider now the best responses of ﬁrms with vacancies making offers to the worker at
stage n.2f o rn = T − dt. The only offers consistent with the claimed equilibrium are offers
w ≤ w
#
w+
T−dt
$
because otherwise, given thebest responses ofthe incumbent employerand the
worker, the worker will certainly receive a wage wT−dt >w
#
w+
T−dt
$
. Suppose ﬁrm f with a
vacancy, and belief p f #
wT−dt$
that the worker is type z, deviates by offering w>w
#
w+
T−dt
$
.
Whatever its beliefs p f #
wT−dt$
about the worker’st y p e ,w ≥¯ w
#
w+
T−dt
$
is clearly not a
best response because  ∗
T−dt
#
z,w,w+
T−dt
$
≤ 0 for both ¯ z and z for any w ≥¯ w
#
w+
T−dt
$
so, given the hiring cost ε, it would certainly achieve a higher payoff by bidding w<u and
being sure not to hire the worker. For an offer w such that w
#
w+
T−dt
$
<w< ¯ w
#
w+
T−dt
$
,
it follows from the deﬁnitions of w
#
w+
t
$
and ¯ w
#
w+
t
$
that the incumbent employer matches
w for a ¯ z type worker but not for a z type worker. Thus ﬁrm f acquires a type ¯ z worker if
quitting for exogenous reasons (that is, with probability
#
1 − e−ρdt$
p f #
wT−dt$
) and a type z
34workerwhetherornotquittingforexogenousreasons (thatis, withprobability1−p f #
wT−dt$
).
The probability it acquires a worker of either sort (and so incurs the hiring cost ε) is thus
#
1 − e−ρdt$
p f #
wT−dt$
+
#
1 − p f #
wT−dt$$
= 1 − e−ρdtp f #
wT−dt$
. With the remaining
probability it does not acquire the worker and receives zero ﬂow payoff from T − dt to T,s o
its payoff from the deviation is ˆ  
f
T−dt
#
wT−dt,w,w+
T−dt
$
given by
ˆ  
f
T−dt
#
wT−dt,w,w+
T−dt
$
=
!#
1 − e−ρdt$
p f #
wT−dt$
 ∗
T−dt
#
¯ z,w,w+
T−dt
$
+
#
1 − p f #
wT−dt$$
 ∗
T−dt
#
z,w,w+
T−dt
$
−
#
1 − e−ρdtp f #
wT−dt$$
ε
"
. (53)
Now, it follows from (48) and ¯  T
#
w+
T−dt
$
= 0 that  ∗
T−dt
#
z,w,w+
T−dt
$
< 0f o ra n yw>
w
#
w+
T−dt
$
. Moreover, as dt → 0,
#
1 − e−ρdt$
→ 0, whereas
#
1 − e−ρdtp f #
wT−dt$$
→
#
1 − p f #
wT−dt$$
> 0f o rp f #
wT−dt$
< 1. It thus follows that
lim
dt→0
ˆ  
f
T−dt
#
wT−dt,w,w+
T−dt
$
=
#
1 − p f #
wT−dt$$
lim
dt→0
!
 ∗
T−dt
#
z,w,w+
T−dt
$
− ε
"
< 0, (54)
the strict inequality holding even if  ∗
T−dt
#
z,w,w+
T−dt
$
→ 0a sw → w
#
w+
T−dt
$
. Thus,
there exists δ>0 such that, for any dt <δ , ˆ  
f
T−dt
#
wT−dt,w,w+
T−dt
$
< 0f o ra n yd e v i a t i o n
w>w
#
w+
T−dt
$
. Any such deviation is not, therefore, a best response for dt sufﬁciently small.
For the claimed equilibrium p f #
wT−dt$
= p for all f . In that case, playing the Bertrand
responseisabestresponseby thestandardargumentforBertrandgames. Thatinvolvesoffering
the highest w such that GT−dt
#
w,w+
T−dt
$
≥ 0 if that results in u
!
= w0 #
w+
T−dt
$"
≤ w ≤
w
#
w+
T−dt
$
and offering some w<u otherwise. Given the matching and myopic responses of
the incumbent employer and the worker, the wage wT−dt actually paid then satisﬁes Properties
2 and 3 of the proposition. Note that, if any play before T −dt were to result in p f #
wT−dt$
 =
p, the wage offer by ﬁrm f would be non-decreasing in p f #
wT−dt$
.
Now consider n = T − 2dt. Given the equilibrium plays at T − dt, the only reason the
worker might deviate from the myopic response by turning down the highest wage offer for
period T − 2dt is if it would alter the beliefs of outside ﬁrms at T − dt in such a way as to
increase the wage wT−dt. The possible deviations are for the worker to accept a lower offer
or no offer (wT−2dt = 0). But, given that the wage offer at T − dt by outside ﬁrm f is
non-decreasing in p f #
wT−dt$
, for reasonable beliefs as deﬁned such a deviation is worse for
the present and no better for the future, so it is not a best response. The worker still cannot
do better than by being non-discriminatory. Thus the myopic/non-discriminatory response is
a best response at T − 2dt. Similarly, the current employer’s best response continues to be
the matching response. If the higher of the worker’s reservation wage and the best outside
offer is w,i f ∗
T−2dt
#
z,w,w+
T−2dt
$
≥ e−rdt ¯  T−dt
#
w+
T−2dt
$
, and if the current employer
offers less than w, it loses the worker and so reduces its payoff, thus doing worse than by
35matching. If, on the other hand, it offers more than w, that reduces proﬁts in the current
period. Moreover, given reasonable beliefs, it does not reduce the wages outside ﬁrms will
offer for that worker at T − dt. Thus the incumbent employer offers no more than w.I f
 ∗
T−2dt
#
z,w,w+
T−2dt
$
< e−rdt ¯  T−dt
#
w+
T−2dt
$
,o n l ya no f f e rl e s st h a nw is a best response.
But any such offer is a matching response as deﬁned.
Consider now the best responses of ﬁrms with vacancies making offers to the worker at
stage n.2f o rn = T − 2dt. The only offers consistent with the claimed equilibrium are offers
w ≤ w
#
w+
T−2dt
$
because otherwise, given the best responses of the incumbent employer and
the worker, the worker will certainly receive a wage wT−2dt >w
#
w+
T−2dt
$
. Suppose ﬁrm f
with a vacancy, and belief p f #
wT−2dt$
that the worker is type z, deviates by offering w>
w
#
w+
T−2dt
$
. Whatever its beliefs p f #
wT−2dt$
about the worker’s type, w ≥¯ w
#
w+
T−2dt
$
is
clearly not a best response because  ∗
T−2dt
#
z,w,w+
T−2dt
$
≤ e−rdt ¯  T−dt
#
w+
T−2dt
$
for both ¯ z
and z for any w ≥¯ w
#
w+
T−2dt
$
so, given the hiring cost ε, it would certainly achieve a higher
payoff by bidding w<w 0 #
w+
T−2dt
$
and being sure not to hire the worker. For an offer w such
that w
#
w+
T−2dt
$
<w< ¯ w
#
w+
T−2dt
$
,i tf o l l o w sf r o mt h ed e ﬁnitions of w
#
w+
t
$
and ¯ w
#
w+
t
$
that the incumbent employer matches w for a ¯ z type worker but not for a z type worker. Thus
ﬁrm f acquires a type ¯ z worker if quitting for exogenous reasons (that is, with probability
#
1 − e−ρdt$
p f #
wT−2dt$
) and a type z worker whether or not quitting for exogenous reasons
(that is, with probability 1 − p f #
wT−2dt$
). The probability it acquires a worker of either
sort (and so incurs the hiring cost ε) is thus
#
1 − e−ρdt$
p f #
wT−2dt$
+
#
1 − p f #
wT−2dt$$
=
1 − e−ρdtp f #
wT−2dt$
. With the remaining probability it does not acquire the worker and
receives zero payoff, so its payoff from the deviation is ˆ  
f
T−2dt
#
wT−2dt,w,w+
T−2dt
$
given by
ˆ  
f
T−2dt
*
wT−2dt,w,w+
T−2dt
+
=
’#
1 − e−ρdt$
p f
*
wT−2dt
+
 ∗
T−2dt
#
¯ z,w,w+
T−2dt
$
+
*
1 − p f
*
wT−2dt
++
 ∗
T−2dt
#
z,w,w+
T−2dt
$
−
*
1 − e−ρdtp f
*
wT−2dt
++
ε
(
+ e−ρdtp f
*
wT−2dt
+
e−rdt ¯  T−dt
#
w+
T−2dt
$
. (55)
Now, it follows from (48) that  ∗
T−2dt
#
z,w,w+
T−2dt
$
< e−rdt ¯  T−dt
#
w+
T−2dt
$
for any w>
w
#
w+
T−2dt
$
. Again, as dt → 0,
#
1 − e−ρdt$
→ 0, whereas
#
1 − e−ρdtp f #
wT−2dt$$
→
#
1 − p f #
wT−2dt$$
> 0f o rp f #
wT−2dt$
< 1. It thus follows that
lim
dt→0
ˆ  
f
T−2dt
*
wT−2dt,w,w+
T−2dt
+
= lim
dt→0
%
e−rdt ¯  T−dt
#
w+
T−2dt
$
+
*
1 − p f
*
wT−2dt
++!
 ∗
T−2dt
#
z,w,w+
T−2dt
$
− ε
−e−rdt ¯  T−dt
#
w+
T−2dt
$"&
(56)
< lim
dt→0
e−rdt ¯  T−dt
#
w+
T−2dt
$
, (57)
36the strict inequality holding even if  ∗
T−2dt
#
z,w,w+
T−2dt
$
→ e−rdt ¯  T−dt
#
w+
T−2dt
$
as w →
w
#
w+
T−2dt
$
. Thus, thereexistsδ>0suchthat,foran ydt <δ , ˆ  
f
T−2dt
#
wT−2dt,w,w+
T−2dt
$
<
e−rdt ¯  T−dt
#
w+
T−2dt
$
for any deviation w>w
#
w+
T−2dt
$
. Thus any such deviation gives a
lower payoff than making an offer that the worker will never accept, and is therefore not a best
response, for dt sufﬁciently small.
For the claimed equilibrium p f #
wT−2dt$
= p for all f . In that case, playing the Bertrand
response is a best response by the standard argument for Bertrand games. That involves offer-
ing the highest w such that GT−2dt
#
w,w+
T−2dt
$
≥ 0 if that results in w0 #
w+
T−2dt
$
≤ w ≤
w
#
w+
T−2dt
$
and offering some w<w 0 #
w+
T−2dt
$
otherwise. Given the matching and myopic
responses of the incumbent employer and the worker, the wage wT−2dt actually paid then sat-
isﬁes Properties 2 and 3 of the proposition. Note that, if any play before T −2dt were to result
in p f #
wT−2dt$
 = p, the wage offer by ﬁrm f would be non-decreasing in p f #
wT−2dt$
.
Backwards iteration of the above argument for earlier dates establishes that the myopic and
non-discriminating response by the worker, the matching response by the current employer,
and the Bertrand response for ﬁrms with vacancies are all best responses for each date t ∈
{dt,2dt,...,T − dt}, conditional on p f #
wt$
= p, and result in a wage path that satisﬁes
Properties 2 and 3 of the proposition.
It is common knowledge at t = 0 that the worker is type ¯ z with probability p ∈ (0,1).
It follows that, in the ﬁrst hiring date t = dt, p f #
wdt$
= p ∈ (0,1) for all ﬁrms f with a
vacancy. Along the equilibrium path, the wage set at this date is wdt ≤ w
#
w+
dt
$
by Properties 2
and 3 of the proposition and the worker quits only for exogenous reasons. Since the probability
of exogenous quits is the same for both types, whether or not the worker quits provides no
information about type. Thus, Bayesian updating implies p f #
w2dt$
= p ∈ (0,1) for all ﬁrms
f with a vacancy. A similar argument applies at each hiring date t. Thus, along an equilibrium
path p f #
wt$
= p for all ﬁrms f with a vacancy and Property 1 of the proposition holds for all
t ∈ {dt,2dt,...,T − dt}.
This result has an important consequence. It is not just that strategies consisting of the
Bertrand, matching and myopic/non-discriminating responses for, respectively, ﬁrms with va-
cancies, the incumbent employer, and the worker form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. It is
also that, in any such equilibrium, a ﬁrm with a vacancy at t never bids more for the worker
than w
#
w+
t
$
, the wage that would be matched by the current employer for a worker of the less
good type, if the time interval between offers is sufﬁciently short. The intuition is as follows.
When the employing ﬁrm plays the matching response and the worker the myopic response,
a bidding ﬁrm acquires the worker only at a wage for which the worker’s future proﬁtability
is negative—unless, that is, the worker is quitting for exogenous reasons. For an offer above
w
#
w+
t
$
, it acquires the worker only if of type z or if quitting for exogenous reasons. In the for-
mer case, the acquiring ﬁrm makes a loss in period t and no additional proﬁt subsequently. But
as the time interval dt goes to zero, the probability that a worker quits for exogenous reasons
37becomes negligible. Thus, as long as there is a hiring cost, the acquiring ﬁrm necessarily loses
by offering more than w
#
w+
t
$
.
Property 2 in Proposition 5 is the standard condition for an interior solution given the re-
s t r i c t i o nt ow a g eo f f e r sa tt no more than w
#
w+
t
$
. Bertrand competition between ﬁrms with
vacancies at t pushes the wage offers up to the highest level at which a ﬁrm that acquires the
worker makes at least as much expected proﬁt as from the alternative of making an offer that is
refused for sure and then starting the next period dt later with a vacancy. Since, however, it is
not an equilibrium to offer w>w
#
w+
t
$
at t, ﬁrms with vacancies may make strictly positive
expected proﬁts from acquiring the worker at the equilibrium wage w
#
w+
t
$
because the wage
cannot be pushed higher to remove those proﬁts. Formally, there is a discontinuity in the proﬁt
function at w
#
w+
t
$
because, for any higher wage, the worker always accepts if of type z, not
just if quitting for exogenous reasons. Property 3 in Proposition 5 recognises that, because of
the hiring cost ε,i tm a yn o tb ep r o ﬁtable for ﬁrms with vacancies to bid even the reservation
wage w0 #
w+
t
$
for the worker. Then the incumbent employer simply offers wt = w0 #
w+
t
$
.
(That z > u rules out the possibility that there is no wage at which employment can continue
in the currently employing ﬁrm.)
It can in fact be shown (though at considerably greater length) that any wage path in a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium with reasonable beliefs and a non-discriminating response by the
worker satisﬁes Properties 1–3 of Proposition 5 for dt sufﬁciently small. Even if the worker’s
response is not non-discriminating, any perfect Bayesian equilibrium with reasonable beliefs
can, for dt sufﬁciently small, be described by Properties 1–3 of Proposition 5 with the function
G (.) appropriately modiﬁed.22
The expression in (7) in the main text for the remaining lifetime earnings of a trainee who
quits is for the limiting case as the interval dt between wage offers and the hiring cost ε go to
zero, while the number of ﬁrms with vacancies m goes to inﬁnity. In taking these limits, we
specify that the limit ﬁrst be taken as dt → 0 in order to ensure that dt is always sufﬁciently
small for the results of Proposition 5 to apply.
22In the game to which Proposition 5 applies, a ﬁrm quit by the worker at a previous hiring date forgets the
worker’s type. What happens if that is not the case? If two ﬁrms both know the worker’s type at t + dt,B e r t r a n d
competition results in the worker receiving a wage equal to her true marginal product from t + dt on. If the
incumbent employer adopts the matching response at t, it is always worthwhile for the worker to quit at t because
a second ﬁrm will then learn the worker’s type, which results in a higher wage from t +dt on, without the worker
incurring a lower wage from t to t + dt. With a positive hiring cost, however, ﬁrms with vacancies offer a wage
at t strictly less than w(w+
t ) for at least part of the working lifetime, and for all of it if that lifetime is sufﬁciently
short. The best response of the incumbent employer may then be to more than match the best outside offer so that
the worker incurs a short-term loss from quitting. As long as a wage at t − dt no higher than w(w+
t−dt) is enough
to stop the worker quitting, a wage path satisfying Properties 1–3 of Proposition 5 remains a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. That will not be the case, however, as both the interval between hiring dates and the hiring cost go to
zero because then both the difference between w(w+
t−dt) and the best outside offer, and the period for which this
difference can be paid, also go to zero. We do not explore this possibility further here because it requires moving
away from the limiting case as dt and ε go to 0 that is a very convenient simpliﬁcation for deriving the results in
the main text.
38Deﬁnition 6 A limiting equilibrium wage path is the limit as dt → 0,m→∞and ε → 0
(with limits taken in that order) of a wage path that satisﬁes Properties 1–3 of Proposition 5.
Proposition 6 There is a unique limiting equilibrium wage path. It satisﬁes wt = w
#
w+
t
$
= z
for all t ∈ (0,T].
Proof. It follows from (46) and (47) that
lim
m→∞
¯  t
#
wt,w+
t
$
= 0, for all t ∈ (0,T], (58)
lim
m→∞ lim
dt→0
 ∗
t
#
z,w t,w+
t
$
=
) T
t
e−(r+ρ)(θ−t) (z − wθ)dθ, for all t ∈ (0,T]. (59)
Thus, from (50),
lim
m→∞ lim
dt→0
Gt
#
wt,w+
t
$
=
) T
t
e−(r+ρ)(θ−t) !
z + p
#
¯ z − z
$
− wθ
"
dθ − ε, for all t ∈ (0,T].
(60)
As ε → 0, therefore, the highest wage at t for which limm→∞limdt→0 Gt
#
wt,w+
t
$
≥ 0 for all
t approaches ˆ w deﬁned by
ˆ w = z + p
#
¯ z − z
$
. (61)
By Property 2 of Proposition 5, this is an equilibrium wage if ˆ w ≤ w
#
w+
t
$
. From (48) and
(58), we have that w
#
w+
t
$
is set such that
lim
m→∞ lim
dt→0
 ∗
t
#
z,w
#
w+
t
$
,w+
t
$
= 0, for all t ∈ (0,T]. (62)
Because this must hold for all t, the derivative of the left hand side with respect to t must also
be zero for all t. That and (59) imply
z − w
#
w+
t
$
+ (r + ρ)
) T
t
e−(r+ρ)(θ−t) #
z − wθ
$
dθ = 0, for all t ∈ (0,T]. (63)
It follows that w
#
w+
T
$
= z.B u t¯ z > z and we know from Proposition 5 that the wage cannot
exceed w
#
w+
t
$
for any t. Hence, it must be that wT = z. It follows directly from repeating this
argument for earlier t that wt = w
#
w+
t
$
= z for all t.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. As the number of ﬁrms with vacancies be-
comes large and the hiring cost becomes small, ﬁrms with vacancies would be prepared to pay
up to the average productivity of the two types, z + p
#
¯ z − z
$
, to hire the worker if quitting
for exogenous reasons. But the incumbent employer is willing to pay only up to z to retain a
worker of the less productive type. So, if ﬁrms with vacancies offer more than z, a less pro-
ductive worker will always accept, not just if quitting for exogenous reasons, and whichever
39outside ﬁrm acquires the worker makes a loss on that type. That swamps the higher produc-
tivity of the more productive type quitting for exogenous reasons. Thus, outside offers never
rise above z even though any outside ﬁrm that acquires the worker at that wage makes a strictly
positive proﬁt from doing so.
The expression in (7) for the remaining lifetime earnings of a trainee who quits follows
directly from Proposition 6 in view of the deﬁnition of z = w0 + γg(c).
B The incentive constraints for t > 0
This appendix shows that, given any W (0,τ)that satisﬁes (23) for t = 0, it is always possible
to ﬁn daw a g ep a t hw(t) that satisﬁes (23) for all 0 < t ≤ τ with w(0) >w 0 a n dw i t ht h e
training ﬁrm wishing to retain less good trainees up to τ.
First note that, since w(t) is a ﬂow, its value at the isolated point t = 0 is negligible relative
to its present discounted value over the interval τ. Thus, we can set w(0) = w0 + ε for
ε>0 without affecting subsequent values of w(t) for given W (0,τ). Let the wage over the
remainder of the contract period be constant at
w =
W (0,τ)
δ (τ)
≥
’
w0 + γg (c)
(
− (1 − γ)g(c)e−ρτβ( T) − β( τ)
δ(τ)
, (64)
where the inequality follows from (23) being satisﬁed at t = 0. Then, from (8),
W (t,τ) = δ( τ− t)w (65)
≥ δ(τ − t)
’
w0 + γg(c)
(
− (1 − γ)g(c)e−ρτδ( τ− t)
δ(τ)
!
β (T) − β (τ)
"
.(66)
Since, by construction, this satisﬁes (23) for t = 0, it is clear by inspection that it will also
satisfy (23) for 0 < t ≤ τ if
e−ρτδ(τ − t)
δ(τ)
!
β (T) − β (τ)
"
≤ e−ρ(τ−t) !
β (T − t) − β (τ − t)
"
, for 0 < t ≤ τ, (67)
or
δ( τ− t)
δ(τ)
≤ eρt β( T − t) − β( τ− t)
β (T) − β (τ)
, for 0 < t ≤ τ, (68)
or, using the deﬁnitions of β (t) and δ (t) in (1) and (2),
1 − e−(r+ρ)(τ−t)
1 − e−(r+ρ)τ ≤ e(r+ρ)t, for 0 < t ≤ τ,
or
e(r+ρ)t ≥ 1, for 0 < t ≤ τ.
40This is certainly true given r and ρ ≥ 0.
We next show that, at the wage in (64), the training ﬁrm wishes to retain even less good
trainees up to τ. To see this, note that the training ﬁrm would wish to continue the contract
after 0 < t ≤ τ even for type γ trainees provided
δ (τ − t)
’
w0 + γg(c)
(
− W (t,τ) + e(r+ρ)tS ≥ 0 for 0 < t ≤ τ. (69)
Now consider (69) for the total wage bill given by (24) so that (23) holds with equality at t = 0
and W (t,τ) is given by equality in (66). Then (69) can be written
e(r+ρ)tS ≥−(1 − γ)g(c)e−ρτδ( τ− t)
δ (τ)
!
β( T) − β( τ)
"
, for 0 < t ≤ τ, (70)
which, since γ<1a n dβ (T) ≥ β (τ), is clearly true for any S ≥ 0. Finally, suppose that (23)
holds with strict inequality, in which case any optimal apprenticeship has W (0,τ) = ¯ W. Then
the addition over the present discounted value of wages making (23) hold with equality that is
required to make W (0,τ) = ¯ W can all be paid to the worker on agreeing to the contract at
t = 0 and wages for 0 < t ≤ τ paid as above. Then clearly (70) is unaffected and continues to
hold.
CT r a i n i n g w h e n i t i s e f ﬁcient to train all workers
This appendix considers training outcomes when it is efﬁcient to train all workers, that is k∗
1 ≥
k∗
2. Then ¯ W, the lifetime value of wages that equates demand and supply for workers at initial
hiring, can be greater than βw0 because the supply of workers may be less than the demand for
workers by ﬁrms wanting to train at the lifetime value of wages βw0. A market equilibrium can
be deﬁned formally as follows. Let ¯ k
# ¯ W
$
denote the highest ﬁx e dc o s to ft r a i n i n ga tw h i c hi t
is proﬁtable to train with a proﬁt maximizing training arrangement when the expected lifetime
utility of workers hired in the market at age 0 is ¯ W. Then ¯ W is a market equilibrium if it
satisﬁes
¯ k( ¯ W) ≤ k∗
2 (71)
¯ W ≥ βw0 (72)
either ¯ W = βw0 or ¯ k( ¯ W) = k∗
2. (73)
(k∗
2 was deﬁned above as the highest capital cost that needs to be incurred for all workers to be
trained.)
41C.1 Training without contracts
Suppose ¯ W is sufﬁciently high that (10) is not a binding constraint at t = 0f o ra n yl e v e lo fc
chosen by a training ﬁrm. What then limits how low the wage can go is that the expected utility
of joining a training ﬁrm given by (9) with t = 0 is at least as great as ¯ W.T h a ti s ,e x p e c t e d
wages from the training ﬁrm W must satisfy
W ≥ ¯ W − (β − δ)
’
w0 + γg(c)
(
. (74)
Substitution of this into the expression for a training ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts (11) allows those
expected proﬁts to be written
 1 #
k,c, ¯ W
$
=
!
(1 − γ)δ + γβ
"
g(c) + βw0 − ¯ W − (k + c) (75)
for which the ﬁrst order condition for the optimal level of training c1 is
!
δ + γ (β − δ)
"
g 
*
c1
+
= 1. (76)
It follows from (15) and strict concavity of g(.) that c1 > c0, though still c1 < c∗ deﬁned
in (4). The intuition is that, although a ﬁrm’sp r o ﬁts from training are lower when wages are
higher, the worker captures less of the marginal returns to additional training. Indeed, since
β>δ , a higher value of γ actually increases the amount of training, which approaches the
efﬁcient level c∗ as γ → 1. The reason is that more training enables those workers who quit
for exogenous reasons to obtain a higher wage in another ﬁrm and, because (10) is not binding,
the training ﬁrm is able to lower its wage as a result. As γ approaches 1, those quitting for
exogenous reasons capture all the return on training after they quit, so their new employers
receive no external beneﬁt from the training.
If (10) at t = 0 is not binding at c0 but becomes binding at some c < c1, then c is the
proﬁt maximizing level of training for training ﬁrms to provide. Moreover, for (10) not to be
a binding constraint for some training c, it must be that the expected lifetime value of wages
ﬁrms must pay to hire trainees, ¯ W, exceeds what trained workers can obtain by quitting, given
by (7) for t = 0. That is, ¯ W ≥ β
!
w0 + γg(c)
"
.F o r ¯ W >β w 0 to be an equilibrium, it must
be that all workers are trained at that wage. (This is expressed formally by (73).) Since k∗
2 is
deﬁned as the ﬁxed cost that must be incurred by the marginal training ﬁrm when all workers
are trained, it follows from (75) that all workers will actually be trained at this wage only if
k∗
2 ≤
!
(1 − γ)δ + γβ
"
g(c) + βw0 − ¯ W − c, (77)
42or, with ¯ W at the lowest level β
!
w0 + γg (c)
"
,
k∗
2 ≤ (1 − γ)δg(c) − c. (78)
Thus, if (78) is satisﬁed for c = c0, the market equilibrium level of training is the higher level
thatsatisﬁes(78)withequalityprovidedthatlevelislessthanc1,a n dc1 otherwise. Theanalysis
in the main text applies whenever (78) is not satisﬁed at c = c0. In view of the deﬁnition of k∗
1
in (5), the condition for that can be written
k∗
1 < k∗
2 +
!
βg
#
c∗$
− c∗"
− (1 − γ)δg
*
c0
+
+ c0. (79)
For higher values of k∗
1, all workers are trained and the amount of training received by each
trainee is the lower of c1 and the amount that gives equality in (78).
C.2 Training contracts
Suppose ¯ W is sufﬁciently high that (23) is not a binding constraint at t = 0f o ra n yl e v e lo fc
chosen by a training ﬁrm. That does not alter the analysis of the optimal training for any given
contract, so (18) still applies. What, however, now limits how low the wage can go is that the
expected utility of joining a training ﬁr mg i v e nb y( 2 2 )w i t ht = 0 is at least as great as ¯ W.
That is, expected wages W from the contract must satisfy
W ≥ ¯ W −
’
w0 + γg (c)
(!
β − δ(τ)
"
− (1 − γ)g(c)e−ρτ !
β − β (τ)
"
. (80)
Substitution of this into the expression for a training ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts (17), when there
is no subsidy (S = 0 )a n dt r a i n i n gl e n g t hτ( c) is chosen to induce training c, allows those
expected proﬁts to be written
˜  1 #
k,c, ¯ W
$
=
’
(1 − γ) ˜ δ(τ (c)) + γβ
(
g (c) + βw0 − ¯ W − (k + c), (81)
where ˜ δ( τ)is deﬁned in (26). Since, from (28), ˜ δ( τ)>δfor τ<T, expected proﬁts from
offering a training contract given by (81) are greater than those from not offering a training
contract given by (75) for c < ¯ c deﬁned by (19), and are the same for c =¯ c, exactly as in the
case of k∗
1 < k∗
2 discussed in the main text. The difference in the case k∗
1 ≥ k∗
2 is that the level
of training that is optimal with no contract if (78) is satisﬁed with strict inequality for c =¯ c is
not feasible with a training contract, for which the highest feasible level of training is ¯ c that is
attained when τ = T. Moreover, that optimal level yields higher expected proﬁt than c =¯ c
when no contract is used and, since the expected proﬁt with c =¯ c is the same with a contract as
without, it also yields higher proﬁt than c =¯ c with a contract. Thus the argument in the main
text does not guarantee that ﬁrms make greater expected proﬁt with a contract than without in
43this case.
The argument in the main text does, however, apply as long as the level of training chosen
without a contract is less than ¯ c. From (78), that will be the case whenever
k∗
2 >( 1 − γ)δg (¯ c) −¯ c, (82)
or, equivalently,
k∗
1 < k∗
2 +
!
βg
#
c∗$
− c∗"
− (1 − γ)δg(¯ c) +¯ c.
When this condition is satisﬁed, it is certainly more proﬁtable for ﬁrms to use training contracts
even though it is efﬁcient to train all workers.
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